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between public health and law enforcement by examining fusion centers and Joint 
Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs). The data collection instruments for this thesis were three 
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departments. Only one of the 23 surveyed fusion centers truly includes public health 
considerations in its functions, a decrease from research conducted by Naval Postgraduate 
School master’s student James Morrissey in 2007. None of the JTTF respondents have a 
public health representative on their task force and, although the public health sector is 
interested in integration, its representatives rarely contact JTTFs and fusion centers to 
initiate collaboration. The data from the literature and surveys indicate that fusion 
centers and JTTFs want to collaborate with the public health sector, as well, but face 
integration obstacles such as funding, manpower, and resources. This thesis 
proposes recommendations to improve collaboration between law enforcement and 
public health agencies across the United States, including removing certain 
requirements to serve, expanding the role of regional public health planners, and re-
expanding federal grant programs to reflect originally established funding opportunities. 
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Law enforcement typically maintains public order and exists to “serve and protect”; 
this mission must be understood within the context of society, politics, governance, and the 
criminal justice system.1 Despite incidents that demonstrate the importance of 
collaboration, law enforcement agencies rarely work closely with public health agencies 
on public health issues, and the same can be said regarding public health practitioners 
working with law enforcement. These two separate disciplines evolved based on differing 
motivations, lending them differing priorities and cultures. This has created a social 
distance between the two disciplines, which engage in occasional ad hoc collaboration with 
“mutual hostility.”2 However, these two disciplines have a common mission in the 
homeland security enterprise: to protect individuals from “ill-health, injury and unnatural 
or untimely death.”3 
During a large-scale public health emergency, law enforcement and public health 
practitioners will undoubtedly exhaust their resources rapidly. While the demands of the 
job will continually be there during the response, officers and public health practitioners 
must make contingency plans for when their staff members become ill, refuse to respond, 
or succumb to illness and pass away. The ability to properly respond to these types of 
emergencies relies heavily on planning and collaboration between law enforcement and 
public health agencies; by forming professional relationships, the two disciplines can 
bolster their response capabilities.  
Terrorist groups continue to strengthen their forces, increasing the need for U.S. 
preparedness. A weapon of mass destruction (WMD) or homegrown violent extremist 
attack involves response efforts from both public health and law enforcement responders. 
While it is clear that investigation of terrorism is within the domain of law enforcement, 
                                                 
1 Auke van Dijk, and Nick Crofts, “Law Enforcement and Public Health as an Emerging Field,” 
Policing and Society 27, no. 3 (April 3, 2017): 261, https://doi.org/10.1080/10439463.2016.1219735. 
2 van Dijk and Crofts, 261.  
3 van Dijk and Crofts, 261. 
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public health officials can provide important information about the nature of biological and 
radiological agents during the investigation and response.  
Fusion centers were created to house representatives from the array of homeland 
security enterprise agencies, with the sole purpose of gathering, analyzing, and then sharing 
potential threat intelligence with law enforcement agencies.4 Another method of formal 
intelligence gathering is the 104 Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) that focus primarily 
on terrorism and “other criminal matters related to various aspects of the counterterrorism 
mission.”5 Fusion centers and JTTFs work together “to safeguard our homeland and 
prevent criminal and terrorist activities.”6 
Historically, public health practitioners have had difficulty receiving key 
information for response efforts, often because of information silos.7 In 2007,  
James Morrissey surveyed 22 fusion centers, 12 of which had established collaborations 
with the public health sector.8 However, the public health positions offered in these 12 
fusion centers were mostly “minimal,” with only one full-time position.9 Today, roughly 
10 years after Morrissey’s research, it is unknown how often, and to what extent, public 
health practitioners are involved in fusion centers nationally. A formal system is needed to 
ensure that the proper public health practitioners are receiving relevant threat information. 
The lack of a current system does not mean that those in public health do not seek 
information. Public health agents do seek information; but without a system in place, this 
information usually comes from informal intelligence sources (news media or social 
                                                 
4 Brienne Lenart et al., “Integrating Public Health and Medical Intelligence Gathering into Homeland 
Security Fusion Centres,” Journal of Business Continuity & Emergency Planning 6, no. 2 (Winter 2012–
Autumn 2013): 175. 
5 “Fusion Centers and Joint Terrorism Take Forces,” Department of Homeland Security, July 29, 
2016, https://www.dhs.gov/fusion-centers-and-joint-terrorism-task-forces. 
6 Department of Homeland Security, “Fusion Centers and Joint Terrorism Task Forces.” 
7 Joe Eyerman and Kevin Strom, “A Cross-national Comparison of Interagency Coordination between 
Law Enforcement and Public Health,” RTI Project Number 08914 (research report, NC: RTI International, 
2005), vii, https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/212868.pdf.  
8 James F. Morrissey, “Strategies for the Integration of Medical and Health Representation within Law 
Enforcement Intelligence Fusion Centers” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007), 27, 
https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=471887. 
9 Morrissey, 27.  
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media) rather than formal sources (fusion centers, local law enforcement, and federal law 
enforcement).  
Notably, the benefits of improving collaboration between the public health sector 
and fusion centers and JTTFs are not one-sided. Public health practitioners can act as 
subject-matter experts in fusion centers, especially for WMD threats such as chemical, 
biological, and radiological events.10 The research conducted for this thesis aimed to 
determine the current level of integration between public health and law enforcement by 
measuring the integration of public health considerations in fusion centers and JTTFs. 
Three distinct, but closely related, surveys were sent to fusion centers, JTTFs, and public 
health departments. The fusion center survey was sent to all 77 fusion centers across the 
country with a response rate of 29.87 percent. The public health survey was sent to 24 
public health departments, with a response rate of 66.67 percent (16 responses). The JTTF 
survey was sent to 15 of the country’s 104 JTTFs, with a response rate of 20 percent (three 
responses). 
Of the 23 responding fusion centers, four indicated they have public health 
representatives. However, based on the responses, it is questionable if three of these centers 
have a true public health component. Of the 16 responding public health departments, nine 
represented local departments and seven represented state departments; none of the local 
departments had representatives on the JTTF or in the fusion center, and seven state health 
departments indicated that they have a representative in the fusion center. Of those seven, 
however, only one representative holds a security clearance, so it is unclear the extent of 
the relationship between the remaining six state health departments and their respective 
fusion centers. Two state health departments indicated that they have representatives on 
their local JTTF, but responses later in the survey made their involvement questionable. 
While all three responding JTTFs value public health, none have a public health subject-
matter expert serving on the task force.  
                                                 
10 Adam Bulava, “Fusion Centers & Public Health Agencies: Unlikely or Natural Partners?” Domestic 
Preparedness, August 26, 2009, https://www.domesticpreparedness.com/preparedness/fusion-centers-
public-health-agencies-unlikely-or-natural-partners/. 
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The survey data indicate that fusion centers and JTTFs want to collaborate with the 
public health sector. However, there is less collaboration occurring between public health 
agencies and the other branches of the homeland security enterprise when compared to 
Morrissey’s 2007 research.11 The surveys indicate common issues inhibiting collaboration, 
including a lack of personnel, funding, and reciprocal awareness between the disciplines. 
Several of the public health respondents had difficulty differentiating fusion centers from 
JTTFs, while those in law enforcement continually equated public health with medicine. 
The surveys also revealed that it is difficult to integrate public health practitioners in JTTFs 
and some fusion centers because they are not sworn law enforcement officers. 
Additionally, Department of Justice (DOJ) guidance has recommended including 
various disciplines in the homeland security enterprise. Although the DOJ published 
guidance to facilitate fusion center and public health integration in 2008, the surveys 
revealed that the majority of fusion centers have not implemented the DOJ capabilities. 
This thesis proposes several policy recommendations to enable integration: 
removing the sworn law enforcement officer requirement for fusion center and JTTF staff, 
utilizing pre-existing positions to act as regional liaisons, establishing full-time public 
health positions in fusion centers, and reinstating the original grant amounts of the Public 
Health Emergency Preparedness grant program and the Homeland Security Grant Program. 
Notably, the recommendations to utilize pre-existing positions as regional liaisons and 
establish full-time public health positions are dependent on increased grant funding.  
The public health issues over the past 15 years serve as a reminder to the homeland 
security enterprise. Ebola, Zika, Chikungunya, H1N1, seasonal influenza, the anthrax 
letters, and the emerging discipline of gene editing are all public health factors that affect 
homeland security. Improving information sharing through collaborative efforts is the first 
step in improving situational awareness and decision-making processes for public health 
leadership. The health implications of WMDs are catastrophic; the faster public health is 
aware of an issue, the quicker practitioners can respond to mitigate its impact.  
  
                                                 
11 Morrissey, “Integration of Medical and Health Representation.” 
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I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
In his book, Delivering on Digital: The Innovators and Technologies That Are 
Transforming Government, Dave Eggers introduces the importance of sharing information 
horizontally. But this cannot be done without removing silos that impede communication. 
Eggers thus coined the phrase “hacking the silos”; hacking, in this sense, means using 
“ingenuity and prowess to fix a problem.”1 This thesis aims to describe the current level 
of integration between public health and law enforcement entities and to provide 
solutions for information silos that exist between these two disciplines.  
Public health and law enforcement are two longstanding fields; because they 
operate in separate domains, however, they have infrequent and hesitant interaction with 
each other.2 Law enforcement typically maintains public order and exists to “serve and 
protect” within the context of society, politics, governance, and the criminal justice 
system.3 Despite past incidents that demonstrate the importance of collaboration, such as 
the 2001–2002 anthrax scare, law enforcement agencies rarely work closely with the public 
health sector on public health issues, and the same can be said regarding public health 
practitioners who deal with law enforcement issues.  
These two separate disciplines evolved with differing motivations, leading them to 
operate with differing priorities and cultures. This has created a social distance between 
them, cause them to engage in occasional ad hoc collaboration with “mutual hostility.”4 
However, these disciplines have a common mission in the homeland security enterprise: to 
protect individuals from “ill-health, injury and unnatural or untimely death.”5 Law 
                                                 
1 William D. Eggers, Delivering on Digital: The Innovators and Technologies That Are Transforming 
Government, Kindle edition (New York: RosettaBooks, 2016), loc 303.  
2 Auke van Dijk, and Nick Crofts, “Law Enforcement and Public Health as an Emerging Field,” 
Policing and Society 27, no. 3 (April 3, 2017): 261, https://doi.org/10.1080/10439463.2016.1219735. 
3 van Dijk and Nick Crofts, 261.  
4 van Dijk and Nick Crofts, 261.  
5 van Dijk and Nick Crofts, 261. 
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enforcement officials often deal with matters of health and well-being, but health and 
public health are not entirely synonymous. 
Health, as defined by the World Health Organization, is “a state of complete 
physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity.”6 
Public health, on the other hand, is “the art and science of preventing disease, prolonging 
life and promoting health through the organized efforts of society.”7 The role that public 
health plays in emergencies varies depending on the type of emergency. During most 
events, such as natural disasters, public health efforts serve a supportive role; in instances 
of public health emergencies, however, they serve the lead role. Public health emergencies 
are mainly events of bioterrorism or outbreaks due to a causative agent that is naturally 
occurring or manmade. A few modern examples of public health emergencies are the2001–
2002 anthrax letters, the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, and the isolated 2017 hepatitis A epidemic 
in San Diego, California. 
U.S. public health laws date back to the founding fathers and the Constitution. 
During the colonial period, epidemics had a significant impact on the colonies, which 
ultimately granted the government “broad powers” to abate public health threats.8 
According to Richards, the public health sector has “police powers, as in ‘to police,’ 
meaning to clean up.”9 Public health and law enforcement agencies have a common 
mission to protect the public, yet they rarely work together.  
Depending on the event, law enforcement may have a vital role in public health 
emergency response. This first depends on whether the emergency is the result of a 
manmade attack or, in the case of an outbreak, if the outbreak is naturally occurring. Law 
enforcement is usually the primary discipline in charge of investigating manmade threats, 
                                                 
6 Norman Sartorius, “The Meanings of Health and Its Promotion,” Croatian Medical Journal 47, no. 4 
(August 2006): 662. 
7 “Public Health Services,” World Health Organization, last modified October 13, 2017, 
www.euro.who.int/en/health-topics/Health-systems/public-health-services. 
8 Edward P. Richards, “Collaboration between Public Health and Law Enforcement: The 
Constitutional Challenge,” Emerging Infectious Diseases 8, no. 10 (October 2002): 1157, 
http://doi.org/10.3201/eid0810.020465.  
9 Richards, 1157.  
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though officers may rely on public health practitioners such as epidemiologists and 
biostatisticians. Even for naturally occurring public health emergencies, however, law 
enforcement may still play an important role in crowd control and security at sites where 
medical countermeasures are stored and disseminated, and/or to enforce quarantine orders. 
During such responses, law enforcement agents will need to coordinate their response 
efforts with public health officials, many of whom they have never worked with, and 
perhaps never even met.   
During a large-scale public health emergency, law enforcement and public health 
agencies exhaust their resources rapidly. Because of the continuous nature of response 
demands, officers and public health practitioners must make contingency plans for when 
their staff members become ill, refuse to respond, or even succumb to illness and pass 
away. The ability to properly respond to these types of emergencies relies heavily on 
planning and collaboration between law enforcement and public health officials; in order 
to initiate collaboration, the two disciplines must first form professional relationships.  
Collaboration between public health and law enforcement entities varies across the 
country, which can be problematic during public health emergencies. Fusion centers are 
law enforcement functions through which information is received, analyzed, vetted, and 
shared among disciplines within the homeland security enterprise. Joint Terrorism Task 
Forces (JTTFs) are another law enforcement function that focuses primarily on 
counterterrorism. Establishing partnerships between public health and law enforcement 
entities—facilitated by fusion centers and JTTFs—may improve the nation’s readiness for 
a public health emergency. 
A. PUBLIC HEALTH THREATS  
Public health threats affect both public health practitioners and law enforcement 
personnel. Emergencies involving disease outbreaks or pandemics, biological attacks, and 
radiological exposure, whether they occur naturally or are manmade, require a public 
health response that addresses safety and security issues. Biological and radiological events 
may particularly adversely impact law enforcement, especially if responders fall ill. If law 
 4 
enforcement and public health entities maintain established relationships that freely share 
information, both disciplines will be better prepared for public health emergencies. 
1. Pandemics 
In the context of this thesis, epidemics and pandemics are the result of a naturally 
occurring contagion.10 Such events have made significant impacts throughout human 
history. The plague, also known as the “black death,” ravaged Europe in the mid-14th 
century, causing the death of an estimated 75–200 million people (up to nearly 40 percent 
of the world population).11 More recently, plague epidemics surfaced in China in the 
nineteenth century, and in Vietnam in the 1960s. Also in modern history, the 1918 Spanish 
influenza pandemic spread across the globe, infecting 500 million people—one-third of the 
world’s population—and killing 50 million around the world.12 Many believe that soldiers 
in Spain during World War I served as a catalyst for the virus’s worldwide spread.  
Over the past decade, the world has witnessed multiple epidemic and pandemic 
events that remind public health officials, governmental leaders, and the public about 
mankind’s vulnerabilities to viral and bacterial threats. The Zika epidemic occurred in 2015 
and 2016 in numerous countries, causing disease and birth defects in newborns. In 2014, 
the Ebola virus caused widespread terror and killed more than 11,000 people. In 2009, the 
H1N1 pandemic killed 200,000. The United States is familiar with widespread disease, 
having experienced the impacts of smallpox, cholera, scarlet fever, typhoid, diphtheria, 
polio, measles, pertussis, HIV, and pandemic influenza. 
The world is connected; we can travel the globe with relative ease, creating an 
opportunity for the spread of disease as well. Global travel and climate change are creating 
                                                 
10 An epidemic is a widespread occurrence of disease within a community, state, or country in a given 
amount of time; a pandemic is much wider. A pandemic expands the occurrence of the disease to multiple 
countries around the world.  
11 Stephanie Pappas, “Black Death Survivors and Their Descendants Went on to Live Longer,” 
Scientific American, May 8, 2014, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/black-death-survivors-and-
their-descendants-went-on-to-live-longer/.  
12 Jeffrey Taubenberger and David Morens, “1918 Influenza: The Mother of All Pandemics,” 
Emerging Infectious Disease Journal 12, no. 1 (January 2006), https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/12/1/05-
0979_article. 
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more opportunities for disease to spread—a fact that is only compounded by the growing 
threat of antibiotic resistance. Diseases that once caused pandemics are reemerging, as 
well, as the anti-vaccine movement grows. Pandemics occur naturally; they are not 
instances of terrorism. However, they do represent a threat to homeland security.  
2. Public Health and the Terrorist Threat 
The United States has a storied past with events of terrorism and remains a target 
of radical terrorist groups. Groups such as Al Qaeda, the Taliban, the Islamic State of Iraq 
and al-Sham (ISIS), and domestic terrorist organizations continue to strengthen their 
indoctrination efforts and therefore their forces, thus increasing the need for U.S. 
preparedness. The development and use of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) are also 
a concern for the public health and medical communities. The terroristic threat to the 
United States is multidimensional; it comes from various geographic origins across the 
globe. Homegrown violent extremists, many of whom have been radicalized by ISIS 
propaganda, pose a significant threat. A WMD or homegrown violent extremist attack 
involves response efforts from both public health and law enforcement agents.  
While it is clear that investigation of terrorism is within the domain of law 
enforcement, public health officials can provide important information about the nature of 
biological and radiological agents to aid investigation and response efforts. The public 
health sector has detailed information about the health threats of, and available treatments 
for, such events. To further define the issues that accompany WMD attacks, it is important 
to understand biological warfare and radiological warfare, and to review the prior threats 
and possible impacts of both. 
a. Biological Warfare 
Some believe that the first instance of biological warfare occurred more than 2,000 
years ago, when the Hittites used tularemia against their foe; the first recorded instance of 
biological warfare, however, occurred in the 14th century BC, when an epidemic of 
Francisella tularensis, commonly referred to as tularemia, made its way through Iraq and 
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Syria during a time of war.13 Since then, armies and governments have used biological 
agents to limit their opponents on the battlefield. In the Neshite–Arzawan conflict, around 
1320 BC, diseased animals were to infect opponents.14 In the fourth century BC, Scythian 
archers submersed arrows in decaying remains and, allegedly, snake venom.15 Arrows 
were similarly used to transmit plague in 1437.16 Other pre-modern instances of biological 
warfare include Barbossa poisoning water wells with human bodies in Tortona, Italy (1155 
AD), Mongols hurling plague-infected dead bodies over the walls of Caffa (1346), British 
troops purposely infecting Native Americans with smallpox via blankets (1763), and 
Confederate soldiers selling clothing laden with smallpox and yellow fever to Union 
soldiers during the United States Civil War (1863).17  
The discoveries of Robert Koch and Louis Pasteur ushered in the modern era of 
biological warfare. Pasteur is best known for his discoveries in germ theory in the 1860s, 
and Koch for his discoveries involving the causative agents of Bacillus anthracis and 
Mycobacterium tuberculosis in the 1870s. Though their discoveries were a great leap for 
the study of biology and the future of medicine, their successes also provided insight into 
how to isolate pathogens and control how pathogenic agents are distributed.18 In World 
War I, Germany and France used these new discoveries to establish covert biological 
warfare programs.19 The Soviet Union also developed a biological weapons program that 
caused a tragic 1979 outbreak in Sverdlovsk, resulting in the loss of Russian citizens and 
cattle.20  With advances in science and medicine, the biological threat only grows stronger. 
                                                 
13 Siro Igino Trevisanato, “The ‘Hittite Plague’, an Epidemic of Tularemia and the First Record of 
Biological Warfare,” Medical Hypotheses 69, no. 6 (January 1, 2007): 1371, http://doi.org/10.1016/ 
j.mehy.2007.03.012. 1371. 
14 While the Neshite–Arzawan conflict may not be the defined start of biological warfare, it is the first 
recorded instance. Trevisanato, 1374. 
15 V. Barras, and G. Greub, “History of Biological Warfare and Bioterrorism,” Clinical Microbiology 
and Infection 20, no. 6 (June 2014): 498, http://doi:10.1111/1469-0691.12706. 
16 Barras and Greub, 498.   
17 Barras and Greub, 498.   
18 Barras and Greub, 499. 
19 Barras and Greub, 499.  
20 Matthew Meselson et al., “The Sverdlovsk Anthrax Outbreak of 1979,” Science 266, no. 5188 
(1994): 1202–3, http://doi.org/10.2307/2885382.  
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The anthrax attacks in 2001 demonstrate the possibility of successfully 
implementing a bioterrorism attack on American soil. The attack resulted in five deaths, 
severe illness for 17, mental anguish for thousands, and more than $6 billion in response 
and recovery funds.21 In 2010, a report from the Commission on the Prevention of WMD 
Proliferation and Terrorism claimed that “further attacks are possible in the relatively near 
term, stating specifically that unless the world community acts decisively and with great 
urgency, it is more likely than not that a WMD will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere 
in the world by the end of 2013.”22 The commission also concluded that future attacks are 
more likely to be biological in nature.23  
For centuries, man has taken advantage of the low cost of biological weapons, as 
well as the minimal barriers to their procurement. Although international laws have 
attempted to regulate biological weapons, legislation has done little to prevent their 
development.24 The threat of bioweapon proliferation is compounded by the probability 
that extremists may obtain weaponry from national weapons programs, or perhaps establish 
their own bioweapons program.25   
Today, anyone educated in genomes can easily recreate a virus that occurs in nature, 
and can alter its fragments so that, once exposed to humans, the virus can easily spread by 
contagion. Oligonucleotides can be ordered through the mail and used to build virus 
                                                 
21 “Amerithrax or Anthrax Investigation,” Federal Bureau of Investigation, accessed October 28, 
2016, https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/amerithrax-or-anthrax-investigation; Molly J. Hall et al., 
“The Psychological Impacts of Bioterrorism,” Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, 
and Science 1, no. 2 (2003): 139–44, http://doi.org/10.1089/153871303766275817.    
22 Gillian SteelFisher et al., “Public Response to an Anthrax Attack: Reactions to Mass Prophylaxis in 
a Scenario Involving Inhalation Anthrax from an Unidentified Source,” Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: 
Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science 9, no. 3 (September 2011): 240, http://doi.org/10.1089/bsp.201 
1.0005.  
23 SteelFisher et al., 240. 
24 James B. Petro, Theodore R. Plasse, and Jack A. McNulty, “Biotechnology: Impact on Biological 
Warfare and Biodefense,” Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science 1, no. 
3 (2003): 161–68, http://doi.org/10.1089/153871303769201815.  
25 Petro, Plasse, and McNulty. 
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genomes.26 The decoded genomes for the 1918 avian flu, smallpox, polio, and other 
viruses have been released by scientists and are now posted on various websites.27 In an 
article in Biosecurity and Bioterrorism, Petro, Plasse, and McNulty stated: 
With the advent of recombinant DNA technology, researchers have 
developed standard methodologies for altering an organism’s genetic 
makeup. Application of this technology to enhance traditional biological 
warfare agents has led to the classification of genetically modified BW 
agents as a separate category of BW agents. Examples of potential 
modifications include antibiotic resistance, increased aerosol stability, or 
heightened pathogenesis. Importantly, genetic modifications may alter 
epitopes or sequences used for detection and diagnostics, necessitating that 
multiple points of reference be incorporated into these systems and 
highlighting the need for security regarding bio-detection strategies. 
Ultimately, these modifications serve to increase effectiveness of a 
traditional BW agent or counteract known aspects of the target population’s 
biomedical defense strategy without significantly manipulating the parental 
organism in a manner that might compromise natural properties suitable for 
biological warfare use.28 
Essentially, if he or she possesses the proper skillset, an individual can make a biological 
agent more contagious, more resistant to treatments, and harder to detect.  
The equipment needed to create enhanced biological agents is becoming increasing 
efficient and less expensive.29 The automated commercial equipment used today can 
process biological material that once required numerous researchers, and it can do so in a 
fraction of the time when compared to past capabilities.30 Used laboratory equipment with 
this biological processing power is now being sold on the second-hand market; nefarious 
actors can purchase a home laboratory with which to manufacture custom biological agents 
                                                 
26 Oligonucleotides are small segments of Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) and Ribonucleic Acid 
(RNA) that are used in genetic testing and research purposes. Philip Bobbitt, Terror and Consent (New 
York: Knopf Doubleday, 2008), 103. 
27 Bobbitt, 103. 
28 Petro, Plasse, and McNulty. “Biotechnology,” 162. 
29 Robert H. Carlson, Biology Is Technology (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), 63–
4. 
30 Carlson, 64. 
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for less than $5,000.31 In 2015, researchers from the Johns Hopkins University Center for 
Health Security conducted a Delphi study among subject-matter experts about the 
likelihood of a large-scale biological attack within 10 years.32 Of the respondents, 57.5 
percent felt that a biological attack was possible.33 The American public is even more 
concerned about biological attacks. According to a public opinion poll conducted by the 
Alliance for Biosecurity, 90 percent of Americans are worried that terrorists might use 
biological weapons against the United States or its allies.34 
b. Radiological Warfare 
Prior to the events of September 11, 2001, Americans rarely considered radiological 
terrorism a major concern to homeland security. The nuclear weapons used decades earlier 
are a distant memory for the emerging generation of Americans. However, a new type of 
warfare was launched against the United States on that Tuesday morning in 2001, and 
Americans are now more likely to believe that sophisticated attacks against the United 
States are a possibility. 
Numerous existing and emerging terrorist cells and rogue nations have the ability 
to obtain the materials needed to construct a radiological dispersal device. According to 
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, radiological dispersal devices “consist 
of radioactive material combined with conventional explosives. They are designed to use 
explosive force to disperse the radioactive material over a large area, such as multiple city-
blocks.”35 These devices can kill anyone in the immediate vicinity of the explosion, but 
also cause a great amount of fear; most people understand very little about radiological 
                                                 
31 Carlson, 64.  
32 For the purpose of this study, researchers categorized a large-scale attack as one that impacts 100 or 
more individuals.  
33 Crystal Boddie et al., “Assessing the Bioweapons Threat., Science 349, no. 6250 (August 21, 2015): 
792–3, https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aab0713. 
34 “American Perceptions of Biosecurity Preparedness,” Alliance for Biosecurity, March 2016, 
https://www.allianceforbiosecurity.com/biosecurity-public-opinion-poll.  
35 “Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDD) / Dirty Bombs,” Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration, accessed October 12, 2017, https://www.osha.gov/SLTC/emergencypreparedness/ 
rdd_tech.html.  
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material. Psychological terrorism can induce panic and can also create a financial burden 
due to decontamination efforts.36  
3. Threat of Biological and Radiological Terrorism 
Biological warfare remains a threat in the modern era. The Japanese doomsday cult 
Aum Shinrikyo tried to weaponize the Zaire strain of Ebola in 1992 when preparing for its 
attacks; the group later settled on utilizing the nerve agent sarin.37 Aum Shinrikyo also 
considered building a uranium bomb; the group was able to procure the necessary 
equipment to enrich its own uranium in an effort to contain operations within the 
organization.38 Similarly, Osama bin Laden tried to procure a nuclear weapon from the 
former Soviet Union, reportedly spending more than £2 million on an intercessor in 
Kazakhstan.39 In an interview regarding the state of Israel, Osama bin Laden stated, “We 
don’t consider it a crime if we tried to have nuclear, chemical, biological weapons. Our 
holy land is occupied by Israeli and American forces. We have the right to defend ourselves 
and to liberate our holy land.”40 Clearly, Al Qaeda was not above using weapons of mass 
destruction; although bin Laden is dead, Al Qaeda remains a threat and may still intend to 
create WMDs.  
In 2014, a laptop was recovered from a member of ISIS that contained instructions 
for developing biological weapons from bubonic plague, which can be easily found in an 
animal in the group’s region.41 In the same year, ISIS seized control of a former Iraqi 
chemical weapons facility that was believed to have more than 2,500 rockets containing 
                                                 
36 The public may demand a clean area be decontaminated due to fear that the environment is harmful. 
37 Gavin Cameron, “Multi-track Microproliferation: Lessons from Aum Shinrikyo and Al Qaida,” 




40 “I Am Not Afraid of Death,” Newsweek, January 10, 1999, http://www.newsweek.com/i-am-not-
afraid-death-165374.  
41 Nada Eweiss, “Non-state Actors & WMD: Does ISIS Have a Pathway to a Nuclear Weapon?” 
British American Security Information Council, March 29, 2016, http://www.basicint.org/sites/default/ 
files/NonStateActors_WMD_Mar2016.pdf. 
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dangerous nerve agents, such as sarin.42 Per the International Atomic Energy Agency, ISIS 
also obtained more than 40 kilograms of uranium from an Iraqi university in 2014.43 
Although it is unlikely that ISIS has the materials necessary to enrich the uranium, the 
group could easily fashion a dirty bomb from the stolen uranium.44 
North Korea has been testing its nuclear weapons program for more than a decade 
with the hope of fitting a nuclear weapon to a long-range missile. Additionally, the country 
announced it had successfully tested a hydrogen bomb in September 2017. Add this issue 
to the continued tension between the United States and North Korea, and there is an ever-
present threat of a radiological disaster.45 North Korea’s first nuclear test occurred in 2006, 
at which point U.S. intelligence agencies had already briefed Congress on the emerging 
threat of Korean biological weapons. At the time, North Koreas abilities were limited; in 
December 2017, however, intelligence officials and weapons experts reported that North 
Korea was procuring the machinery to produce advanced biological weapons from 
“factories that can produce microbes by the ton.”46 Additionally, intelligence officials 
indicated that the production of these weapons and agents could go undetected since the 
production facilities are civilian factories.  
Established and emerging adversaries wish to inflict harm on American citizens; as 
demonstrated by recent attempts to manufacture WMDs, this treat will continue. The 
deaths, as well as physiological and psychological consequences, resulting from WMDs 
would have a devastating impact on the American people. 
                                                 
42 Eweiss.  
43 Michelle Nichols, “Exclusive: Iraq Tells U.N. That ‘Terrorist Groups’ Seized Nuclear Materials,” 
Reuters, July 9, 2014, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-security-nuclear/exclusive-iraq-tells-u-n-
that-terrorist-groups-seized-nuclear-materials-idUSKBN0FE2KT20140709. 
44 Nichols. 
45 Joshua Berlinger and Taehoon Lee, “Nuclear Test Conducted by North Korea, Country Claims,” 
CNN, September 3, 2017, https://www.cnn.com/2017/09/03/asia/north-korea-nuclear-test/index.html. 
46 Joby Warrick, “Microbes by the Ton: Officials See Weapons Threat as North Korea Gains Biotech 




4. Impact of Biological and Radiological Terrorism 
A biological or radiological terrorist act could produce intense illness in the target 
area and elicit fear both nationally and worldwide. After September 11, for instance, 
Canada—though it was not directly under attack—created a security agency. Category A 
agents, such as anthrax, botulism, plague, smallpox, and tularemia, have the potential to 
create the most intense adverse impacts on public health.47 Category B agents post the next 
greatest threat; these include: Q fever, brucellosis, glanders, meliododsis, encephaltis, 
tphyus fever, ricin, psittacosis, and waterborne diseases such as cholera.48  
The release of a Category A agent would necessitate the need for a greater public 
health response from practitioners of public health/medical awareness and laboratory 
services, and would cause a need for increased public health surveillance.49 An agent like 
anthrax can produce symptoms in as little as two days, but symptoms may not appear until 
30 days after exposure. According to Jamrog, Shatz, and Smith, if anthrax were released 
into an area with a population of 2.1 million people (the population of the greater 
Washington, DC, area), a treatment delay could cause 50,000 people to die.50 Since the 
initial symptoms of anthrax exposure are similar to the flu, many people may not be aware 
of their exposure; treatment could thus easily be delayed, increasing the possibility of 
death.  
The impacts of radiological terrorism can be minimal to severe. Acute radiation 
syndrome (ARS) occurs when cells die after exposure to total ionizing radiation; for ARS 
to occur, however, an individual must receive a dosage that penetrates the body and enters 
into the organs. ARS symptomology is often based on an individual’s sensitivity to 
radiation, the type of radiation, and the total radiation dose received. There are four phases 
of ARS: the prodromal phase, latent phase, phase of manifested illness, and recovery or 
                                                 
47 Lisa D. Rotz et al., “Public Health Assessment of Potential Biological Terrorism Agents,” 
Emerging Infectious Diseases 8, no. 2 (February 2002): 226, http://doi.org/10.3201/eid0802.010164.  
48 Rotz et al., 226  
49 Rotz et al., 227.  
50 Diane Jamrog, Michael Shatz, and Cassandra Smith, “Modeling Responses to Anthrax and 
Smallpox Attack,” Lincoln Laboratory Journal 17, no. 1 (2007): 118. 
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death.51 The prodromal phase includes “gastrointestinal (GI) symptoms, headache, 
erythema, elevated core body temperature and malaise. An early onset of symptoms 
indicates a higher level of exposure. These symptoms can last a few days.”52 During the 
following latent phase, the individual feels better, perhaps normal, for a few hours to even 
a few weeks. Unfortunately, the radiation exposure manifests once again through additional 
illnesses such as bone marrow syndrome, gastrointestinal syndrome, or syndromes of the 
cardiovascular/central nervous system; sometimes patients can recover from bone marrow 
syndrome (depending on the level of radiation exposure), but recovery is unlikely from the 
others.53 Fortunately, many terror groups do not have the capability to enrich materials, 
which is necessary for a radiological attacks. However, rogue nations may have these 
materials available. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This review covers information about fusion centers and JTTFs, public health 
decision making during crises, situational and domain awareness, public health situational 
awareness, information silos, and collaboration between public health and fusion centers. 
The literature examined in this review comes from official government documents, journal 
articles, official websites, popular literature, and think-tank organizations. 
1. Fusion Centers and JTTFs 
Fusion centers were created to house representatives from the array of homeland 
security enterprise agencies (both public and private), with the sole purpose of gathering, 
analyzing, and then sharing potential threat intelligence with law enforcement agencies.54 
These centers focus on “terrorism, criminal, and public safety matters in support of 
                                                 
51 “CDC Radiation Emergencies—Acute Radiation Syndrome: A Fact Sheet for Physicians,” Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention, August 23, 2017, https://emergency.cdc.gov/radiation/arsphysician 
factsheet.asp. 
52 Moti Hagby et al., “Health Implications of Radiological Terrorism: Perspectives from Israel,” 
Journal of Emergencies, Trauma and Shock 2, no. 2 (2009): 118, http://doi.org/10.4103/0974-2700.50747.  
53 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Acute Radiation Syndrome.” 
54 Brienne Lenart et al., “Integrating Public Health and Medical Intelligence Gathering into Homeland 
Security Fusion Centres,” Journal of Business Continuity & Emergency Planning 6, no. 2 (Winter 2012–
Autumn 2013): 174–9. 
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securing communities and enhancing the national threat picture.”55 Another method of 
formal intelligence gathering and sharing is the country’s 104 JTTFs, which focus 
primarily on terrorism and “other criminal matters related to various aspects of the 
counterterrorism mission.”56 Fusion centers and JTTFs work together “to safeguard our 
homeland and prevent criminal and terrorist activities.”57 
2. Public Health Decision Making during Crises 
Public health practitioners must make important and difficult decisions during 
public health crises. This is especially true when determining school closures during an 
outbreak or deciding to distribute medical countermeasures. Unfortunately, in many 
cases, primary decision makers in public health may have little to no experience making 
tough decisions during crises. According to a 2009 RAND report, there are few tools 
available for “identifying, measuring, and improving public health crisis decision 
making.”58 Additionally, information for public health decision makers is often 
incomplete, which leads to a difficult and uncomfortable situation.59 Public health 
officials are usually forced to balance the “needs of multiple stakeholder groups and 
manage political pressures that often attend these high-stakes decisions”60 The public 
health sector traditionally uses a “consensus approach,” which presents challenges 
when public health practitioners are expected to operate using the emergency-response 
Incident Command System, which employs top-down approach to decision making.61 
According to Seefried, public health leadership makes the assumption that “uncertainty 
is self-reducing over time” and that these incidents are “self-limiting”—the event will 
                                                 
55 “Fusion Centers and Joint Terrorism Take Forces,” Department of Homeland Security (DHS), July 
29, 2016, https://www.dhs.gov/fusion-centers-and-joint-terrorism-task-forces.  
56 DHS. 
57 DHS. 
58 Andrew Parker et al., Measuring Crisis Decision Making for Public Health Emergencies (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND, 2009), xi, https://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR712.html. 
59 Parker et al., 1. 
60 Parker et al., 1. 
61 Parker et al., 1.  
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most likely end on its own.62 These assumptions may render public health officials 
unable to identify the elements that signify a developing disaster. Public health 
practitioners may also assume that action on their part is not required, and that the 
response from other agencies—law enforcement, emergency management, and fire 
departments—is sufficient.63 Furthermore, these public health decision makers often 
rely on an evidence-based approach that is highly regarded within the medical and 
public health communities; but when all parties (including law enforcement) do not 
have this evidence during a crisis, this model may breed indecision among 
stakeholders.64  
3. Situational Awareness and Domain Awareness 
When decision makers do not have enough information during public health 
crises, they in turn face limited situational awareness.65 The term “situational 
awareness” stems from U.S. Air Force pilots during the Korean War who needed to 
know the location of the combatant’s plane in order to plan their next move.66 Army 
Field Manual 1-02, Operational Terms and Graphics, defines situational awareness as: 
Knowledge and understanding of the current situation which promotes 
timely, relevant and accurate assessment of friendly, competitive and other 
operations within the battlespace in order to facilitate decision making. An 
informational perspective and skill that fosters an ability to determine 
quickly the context and relevance of events that are unfolding.67 
                                                 
62 Valerie Seefried, “Timely and Accurate Decision-Making during U.S. Public Health Emergencies: 
Incremental Dynamic Decision-Making (IDD) for Public Health Emergency Response,” (dissertation, 
George Washington University, 2009), 39, http://search.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/docview/81963 
2779.  
63 Seefried, 40. 
64 Seefried,42. 
65 Seefried, 42. 
66 Eric Toner, “Creating Situational Awareness: A Systems Approach” (report, Center for Biosecurity 




“More simply,” the U.S. Air Force states, “it’s knowing what is going on around you.”68 
To have situational awareness, Toner believes that a decision maker must have access to 
“the right information (without a lot of noise),” and that he or she must be able to receive 
and analyze the information “and then [be] able to do something useful with it.”69 
Situational awareness exists within domain awareness. While situational awareness 
pertains to a specific incident, domain awareness is the “30,000-foot level” of awareness 
that pertains to the common elements across a specified region.70 
Following the 9/11 Commission report’s publication, fusion centers were created 
at the local, state, and federal levels of government with the intent to promote information 
sharing and interdisciplinary collaboration. As of 2017, every state had at least one fusion 
center, providing a national infrastructure of information sharing at all levels of 
government. Fusion centers and Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs), which are both 
functions of joint law enforcement, can enhance both situational and domain awareness 
through collaborative relationships.  
4. Public Health Situational Awareness 
Events such as the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak, Hurricane 
Katrina, and the anthrax letters underline the need to enhance public health decision 
making processes. It is often difficult to make decisions during emergencies, and many 
public health practitioners have little experience doing so; they do not respond to 
emergency situations as often as responders from other disciplines do, such as firefighters, 
law enforcement agents, and public works employees. As Lenart et al. write, public health 
practitioners face challenges to “validate, extract and subsequently define the critical 
elements of the information provided in official government communiques, in the context 
of their response duties during an emergency.”71 Understandably, practitioners are 
                                                 
68 Mark Edward Lender and Garry Wheeler Stone, Fatal Sunday: George Washington, the Monmouth 
Campaign, and the Politics of Battle (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2016). 
69 Toner, “Creating Situational Awareness.”  
70 Louisiana State University National Center for Biomedical Research & Training, Critical Decision 
Making for Complex Coordinated Attacks (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 2017), 3-26. 
71 Lenart et al., “Integrating Public Health into Homeland Security,” 175.  
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uncomfortable making decisions based on incomplete information with little to no 
experience or training in crisis decision making. This leads to “suboptimal, or worse, 
inappropriate responses [when] health security information is provided in the absence of 
context or it becomes fragmented across amassing situation reports as the incident 
progresse[s], thus increasing the potential for human error.”72  
According to RAND, situational awareness in a public health context “incorporates 
an assessment of threats and vulnerabilities for human health and the resources available 
for mitigating health effects during a response.”73 The 2006 Pandemic and All-Hazards 
Preparedness Act (PAHPA) states that “the Secretary, in collaboration with State, local, 
and tribal public health officials, shall establish a near real-time nationwide public health 
situational awareness capability.”74 Additionally, Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive 21 (HSPD-21) discusses the timely flow of relevant information during a public 
health emergency in several sections. Section 8 states:  
The United States has tremendous resources in both public and private 
sectors that could be used to prepare for and respond to a catastrophic health 
event. To exploit those resources fully, they must be organized in a 
rationally designed system that is incorporated into pre-event planning, 
deployed in a coordinated manner in response to an event, and guided by a 
constant and timely flow of relevant information during an event. This 
Strategy establishes principles and objectives to improve our ability to 
respond comprehensively to catastrophic health events. It also identifies 
critical antecedent components of this capability and directs the 
development of an implementation plan that will delineate further specific 
actions and guide the process to fruition.75  
Section 11 states:  
It is the policy of the United States to plan and enable provision for the 
public health and medical needs of the American people in the case of a 
catastrophic health event through continual and timely flow of information 
                                                 
72 Lenart et al., 175.  
73 Parker et al., “Measuring Crisis Decision Making,” xii.  
74 Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act, Public Law 109-417 (2006): 3678, www.govtrack.us/ 
congress/bills/109/s3678/text.  
75 White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 21: Public Health and Medical 
Preparedness, HSPD-21(Washington, DC: White House, 2007), https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did= 
480002. 
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during such an event and rapid public health and medical response that 
marshals all available national capabilities and capacities in a rapid and 
coordinated manner.76 
Section 35 states:  
Within 180 days after the date of this directive, the Secretary of Homeland 
Security, in coordination with the Attorney General, the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services, and the Director of National Intelligence, shall 
establish a mechanism by which up-to-date and specific public health threat 
information shall be relayed, to the greatest extent possible and not 
inconsistent with the established guidance relating to the Information 
Sharing Environment, to relevant public health officials at the State and 
local government levels and shall initiate a process to ensure that qualified 
heads of State and local government entities have the opportunity to obtain 
appropriate security clearances so that they may receive classified threat 
information when applicable.77 
PAHPA furthrmore states: “the Secretary, in collaboration with State, local, and tribal 
public health officials shall establish a near real-time electronic nationwide public health 
situational awareness capability.”78  
HSPD-21 and PAHPA created an avenue for information-sharing capabilities 
between public health agencies and all levels of government. Public health officials need 
the information to determine if an event is a legitimate threat. The power to do so does not 
immediately materialize during an event; it comes from the process of information sharing 
initiated prior to an emergency. 
5. Information Silos 
An agricultural silo holds and protects important grain that directly impacts a 
farmer’s livelihood; while information silos also hold important content, unlike the 
farmer’s silo, information silos cause trouble for innovation and success across various 
organizations. Information silos occur when sharing between departments or agencies does 
                                                 
76 White House, HSPD-21. 
77 White House, HSPD-21.  
78 Revitalizing the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S. Code 42 (2013) § 247d-4, 
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not occur due to a modular hierarchy. They make sharing information and collaborating 
nearly impossible. 
As previously mentioned, Eggers introduced the idea of “hacking the silos” in his 
book Delivering on Digital: The Innovators and Technologies That Are Transforming 
Government. Horizontal information sharing, he says, cannot be achieved unless the silos 
that impede communication are removed. Eggers discusses a Government Accountability 
Office report that examined three federal governmental departments and found duplicated 
projects in the Department of Defense, DHS, and the Department of Health and Human 
Services. The result was a staggering $321 million in duplicated efforts.79 Eggers also 
discusses David Bray, the chief information officer for the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC). Upon Bray’s arrival, the FCC had 207 software applications for 1,750 
employees—roughly one application for every eight employees.80 Essentially, every time 
a request was made, the FCC made a new application without consulting other federal 
agencies, resulting in duplicated efforts; Bray discovered that 80 percent of his budget 
maintained these systems.81 Bray led the effort to streamline products, subjecting each 
application to an evaluation process. In the end, he saved the FCC more than $3.5 
million.82 While these examples do not directly relate to law enforcement or public health 
decision making, they show how time, funding, and resources can be saved through 
horizontal communication. 
In an attempt to “hack the silos,” the Department of Justice (DOJ) released a 
document entitled Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 
in 2008, along with an appendix entitled Health Security: Public Health and Medical 
Integration for Fusion Centers in 2011. The appendix emphasized the importance of public 
health in the homeland security enterprise, stating, “Integrating the public health and 
healthcare community into a fusion center does not require additional capabilities, but 
                                                 
79 Eggers, Delivering on Digital, loc 2329. 
80 Eggers, loc 23329. 
81 Eggers, loc 23329. 
82 Eggers, loc 23329. 
 20 
simply the incorporation of their information, expertise, and resources into the existing 
fusion center operation.”83 
In the same appendix, the DOJ recognized the importance of information sharing 
with public health. The document states, “Achieving national health security requires 
understanding and sharing information related to human-caused and natural incidents, 
building a network of trusted individuals involved in robust information sharing 
partnerships, building a long-term and sustainable risk management strategy that address a 
changing threat environment, and maximizing the effective use of resources.”84 The 
appendix provides information-sharing capabilities between public health stakeholders and 
fusion centers. These capabilities pertain to improving abilities in chemical, biological, 
radiological, nuclear, and explosives (CBRNE) detection, response, and decontamination 
efforts. The document also supports the efforts of the 2006 PAHPA, emphasizing 
interagency collaboration. Aside from participation in fusion centers, the appendix stresses 
that the public health sector should engage with law enforcement agencies on a regular 
basis; the two disciplines could participate in public health preparedness exercises, or 
create action plans to mitigate observed gaps in real-world response efforts or in 
exercises.85  
6. Collaboration  
Though perhaps a cliché, the common adage “waiting until an emergency to 
exchange business cards is a terrible decision” certainly applies to public health crises. 
While efforts have been made to improve collaboration between the law enforcement and 
public health disciplines, public health stakeholders are still underrepresented in U.S. 
fusion centers. Many agencies have expressed the importance of collaboration among 
fusion centers/JTTFs and public health agencies. As Butler et al. wrote in 2002, 
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“Partnerships between public health and law enforcement is prerequisite to sound 
bioterrorism planning and response.”86 Several agencies are beginning to agree with this 
statement; both the Department of Justice and the National Governors Association have 
pushed for improvements to the public health–law enforcement relationship. But support 
for the public health sector joining forces with JTTFs and fusion centers does not stop 
there. In a 2010 hearing before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Homeland 
Security for the WMD Prevention and Preparedness Act of 2010, Chairman Bob Graham 
and Vice Chairman Jim Talent, stated: 
One important issue not addressed in the intelligence section is the problem 
of not including public health personnel in many of the fusion centers. Only 
a handful of these centers currently include public health officials. We all 
need to understand, in the 21st century, public health is a critical element of 
national and homeland security. Public health resources need to be fully 
integrated with law enforcement and traditional first responders.87 
The anthrax events in September and October 2001 provide insight into how public 
health and law enforcement officials have worked together in the past. In Florida, the 
anthrax cases were originally designated a public health issue rather than a law enforcement 
matter, since officials believed they were caused by naturally occurring anthrax. However, 
public health officials alerted law enforcement early in the investigation, and later 
determined that the cases were inhalational—a rarity in the United States; given the 
heightened awareness to biological weapons following 9/11, public health and law 
enforcement officials were more vigilant.88 Law enforcement involvement increased 
considerably when public health officials realized that anthrax had been released 
intentionally.89 
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Increased integration is needed; the DOJ publications imply, even, that increased 
integration is a federal mandate. However, although the DOJ reports do not indicate the 
current degree of integration, they do suggest that the public health sector has not been 
fully integrated within all fusion centers.  
7. Conclusion  
Fusion centers are primarily staffed by law enforcement officials; but as Lenart et 
al. point out, some fusion centers are slowly integrating a multidisciplinary approach that 
includes other first responder disciplines.90 The questions remain: What is the current 
status of collaboration? How do fusion centers obtain public health information? How do 
public health officials obtain specific information that is applicable to their situations? The 
answers to these questions vary and depend primarily on the connections and relationships 
that have been established between public health partners and fusion centers at the local 
and state levels of government.91  
C. RESEARCH QUESTION AND THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis asks the more pointed question: What are the current rates of public 
health integration within fusion centers and JTTFs, and what factors contribute to this 
integration? By considering this question, this thesis examines how public health 
integration with fusion centers and JTTFs may be improved. A survey was created for 
leaders from local and state fusion centers, JTTFs, and public health departments. 
Following this introduction, Chapter II explores the current programs in place and 
their stakeholders. Chapter III discusses the survey methodology, and Chapter IV examines 
the survey results. Chapter V reviews the data and makes conclusions, which are used to 
create policy recommendations from the discussion in Chapter VI. 
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II. CURRENT STAKEHOLDERS AND PROGRAMS 
In most bio-threat situations, law enforcement and public health agencies conduct 
their own independent investigations, using their respective evaluation procedures and 
protocols.92 According to Strom and Eyerman, multiagency coordination efforts are often 
difficult to maintain in countries like the United States, where there are multiple levels of 
government.93 Strom and Eyerman also believe that coordination is a difficult task for 
agencies that have differing standard operating procedures and rarely work together.94  
Representatives from law enforcement and public health were required to work 
together following 9/11, despite initial friction. For example, several white powder 
incidents in Washington, DC., West Palm Beach, Florida, and New York City in the 
months following 9/11 caused strife between public health and law enforcement entities. 
In an interview with RTI International, a law enforcement officer recalled the arguments 
that took place between “high-ranking state police officials” regarding the inclusion of 
public health sector.95 While this debate took place in government offices, state troopers 
in the field refused to respond to white powder incidents due to uncertainty, and “their lack 
of expertise and misinformation about potential dangers posed to them.”96 Additionally, 
the high-ranking officials wanted to limit testing of the white powder to the state forensic 
laboratory, but, unlike the public health laboratory, the forensic laboratory did not have the 
proper equipment. Ultimately, after much discussion, protocols were put into place that 
allowed the public health laboratory to conduct specimen analysis and share the results 
with the proper law enforcement officials.97 While distrust of the public health laboratory 
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was unfounded in this instance, some events that occur within the homeland security 
enterprise necessitate caution when sharing sensitive information. 
In February 2018, CNN reported that “anti-terrorism” documents were found in a 
seatback pocket on an airplane. The documents were the after-action report and 
improvement plan written following a Super Bowl LII BioWatch exercise. The documents 
were not classified, but were marked as “for official use only.” Additionally, the 
documents’ handling instructions read, “at a minimum, this document should be stored in 
a locked drawer after business hours. The contents should not be shared with individuals 
who do not have an operational need-to-know. The document should be shredded before 
discarding.”98 It is suspected that these documents were left on the airplane by a public 
health official working for or with DHS. Inadvertent leaks or exposure of sensitive 
information occur within every discipline; this can make it difficult for law enforcement 
practitioners to trust someone from another discipline.  
This chapter examines current programs that facilitate integration of public health 
considerations into primarily law enforcement or intelligence structures. Fusion centers 
and JTTFs each offer specific opportunities for this type of integration. This chapter also 
examines what types of information can be collected with public health instruments and 
how current collaboration schemes do not fully incorporate public health data.  
A. FUSION CENTERS 
Fusion centers focus primarily on “terrorism, criminal, and public safety matters in 
support of securing communities and enhancing the national threat picture.”99 Lenart et al. 
state that “fusion centres are designed to be centres with representatives from various law 
enforcement agencies who gather, analyse, and share potential threat information with 
other federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies.”100 The concept of the fusion 
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center originated before 9/11, but only existed in a few locales, and had limited 
collaboration with law enforcement entities. Following 9/11, the authors of the 9/11 
commission report stated that limited collaboration resulted in a failure to “connect the 
dots” and that the “biggest impediment was the human or systematic resistance to sharing 
information.”101 
Fusion centers are not controlled by the federal government, but they often operate 
using federal grant funding.102 The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) also provides an 
integral service, offering liaisons and access to FBI intelligence.103 In addition to the FBI, 
other federal agencies have a working relationship with fusion centers on specific cases. 
These agencies include the Department of Defense, the United States Secret Service, the 
Department of the Treasury, Customs and Border Protection, Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement, and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), among others. The 
extent of fusion centers’ relationships with federal agencies varies across the country and 
is largely dependent upon the operational protocols for each fusion center.104  
Fusion centers have faced harsh criticism over the past decade. A 2012 RAND 
publication, for instance, criticized fusion centers, claiming the national network they 
create is too great to be useful; the publication suggested that fusion centers foster a smaller 
network that focuses solely on high-risk metropolitan areas.105 In a 2013 report, the Senate 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations specifically criticized DHS for failing to 
establish a national standard for fusion centers, and for failing to prove that fusion center 
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funding had led to the apprehension of suspected terrorists.106 The subcommittee also 
accused DHS of “overstating fusion center success stories.”107 DHS, however, claimed 
that the subcommittee report relied on outdated information.108  
B. PUBLIC HEALTH INTEGRATION 
Public health and law enforcement officials work together when a public health 
emergency occurs due to criminal action, but each discipline approaches the investigation 
differently. Butler argues that the type of attack—if it is overt or covert—determines the 
investigation style.109 An overt attack is usually followed by a claim of responsibility, such 
as in many attacks conducted by ISIS. Covert attacks are typically not immediately 
apparent; with a covert attack, for instance, the first indication may be a sick patient 
reporting symptoms to a physician. An overt scenario would primarily be investigated by 
a law enforcement entity, but in the covert scenario, public health officials will likely be 
the first to recognize a pattern and start an investigation. This means a law enforcement 
response may be delayed. However, if public health and law enforcement agencies share 
information and vet intelligence, they may be able to detect the attack sooner. Typically, 
the homeland security enterprise does not share information with public health entities. 
Many public health leaders do not hold the proper security clearance to handle sensitive 
information, nor do they have access to the proper facilities or infrastructure for receiving 
classified information.110 Releasing sensitive information through insecure channels 
increases the likelihood that the information will also reach the community at large, which 
could induce panic or disruption an investigation.111  
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The majority of officials who work in fusion centers come from law enforcement 
agencies.112 According to research from Andrew Coffey, the quality of a fusion center’s 
products and services is directly affected by the strength of the fusion center’s relationships 
with other disciplines.113 Accordingly, fusion centers have been attempting to adopt a 
multi-agency/organizational inclusion concept.114 Examining this phenomenon from a 
public health viewpoint, how do fusion centers obtain health-related information? The 
answer varies and, as Coffey alludes, depends on the relationships each individual fusion 
center has with its public health counterparts. However, with the exception of the vague 
details in the fusion center health security appendix, there are no national standard 
operating procedures for integrating public health considerations into fusion center 
functions—this includes an absence of standards regarding public health intelligence, or 
the necessary qualifications for personnel.115 
Understanding how fusion centers form and maintain relationships with other 
disciplines is a difficult task. As Coffey points out:  
neither scholars nor practitioners have treated the network as a network, 
instead focusing on areas like civil liberties or individual organizational 
capabilities and output based metrics. As a result, very little is known about 
the traits and characteristics of fusion center personnel, the relationships 
between organizational level capacity and capacity at other levels of the 
network, the strength of relationships between individuals and 
organizations, and performance outcomes like effectiveness.116 
Managing a fusion center’s relationships can be challenging simply due to the sheer 
number of relationships. Fusion centers must maintain relationships with other fusion 
centers, DHS liaisons, FBI agents and their respective field offices, other federal 
intelligence entities on a case-by-case basis, members of local and state law enforcement, 
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and non–law enforcement practitioners such as public health and emergency management 
representatives, as well as any established private-sector partnerships.117  
Lenart et al. argue that public health and other response organizations should work 
closely with fusion centers, especially in the areas of “biosurveillance, cohorting of 
individuals suspected of being exposed to infectious diseases or the need to order 
quarantine, evacuation or shelter in place.”118 In the 2001 anthrax case, a physician was 
the first to recognize that anthrax was the causative agent in a patient’s illness; this led to 
an epidemiological investigation, which resulted in a separate investigation by appropriate 
law enforcement officials.  
The public health sector is a consumer of the information disseminated from fusion 
centers. As consumers, public health practitioners (depending on their clearance status) can 
receive “timely unclassified and/or classified threat awareness information and risk 
analysis that may enable them to better guide their preparedness activities.”119 This ability 
to obtain sensitive information may enhance public health practitioners’ capability to 
identify indicators of public health emergencies and respond in an appropriate manner.120  
Public health practitioners can be contributors and collaborators as well. They can 
serve as subject-matter experts and can help analyze information and disseminate fusion 
center intelligence products. As contributors, public health personnel can share information 
with a fusion center pertaining to suspected criminal- or terrorism-related activities.121 
Additionally, public health professionals can serve as educators within a fusion center; they 
can train fusion center analysts to deal with public health emergency preparedness and 
response.122 The DOJ health security appendix also references the Health Security 
Intelligence Enterprise (HSIE), created by the Office of Intelligence and Analysis at 
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DHS—another collaborative approach that aims to include public health practitioners in 
the homeland security enterprise. The HSIE works through collaborative efforts among 
various DHS agencies, including the DHS Office of Health Affairs and FEMA.123 Its 
mission is  
to make the nation safer from all crimes and all hazards, through timely and 
appropriate exchange of information among healthcare, public health 
community, and other multi-disciplinary partners, including the Intelligence 
Community, law enforcement, fire service, emergency management, and 
private sector.124 
HSIE seeks to increase awareness about health security information by engaging 
stakeholders, which enables them to identify and share resources “in hopes of improving 
health security within the intelligence community.”125  
The Kansas Intelligence Fusion Center also utilizes public–private partnerships 
across the state. If the fusion center encounters a biological threat or other type of public 
health emergency, its staff includes the experts that can help, such as Kansas’s state 
epidemiologist, the state veterinarian for instances of vector-borne disease, and “public 
health experts” from the Kansas State University and the University of Kansas.126 All of 
these “subject-matter experts hold Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information 
(TS/SCI) clearances” and serve as part-time public health representatives in the fusion 
center.127 This structure works well because it grants fusion center personnel access to 
important expertise during a public health emergency. Similarly, the state fusion center in 
Michigan utilizes functional desk groups that align agencies based on their disciplines. The 
“environmental desk” is staffed by practitioners from public health, environmental, and 
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agricultural agencies who monitor public health, food and water sources, and healthcare 
organizations for potential threats to public safety.128 Having these representatives at the 
same desk allows information to flow quickly and easily between each agency, which is 
vital during response activities. According to a presentation from the DHS Office of Health 
Affairs, there have been several examples of public health and fusion center collaboration. 
In the past, public health practitioners have interpreted medical information to identify 
indicators of an emerging terroristic threat and have provided support to law enforcement 
investigations.129 Public health officials have assisted with threat assessments for large 
events such as the Super Bowl, NASCAR races, political conventions, and the Boston 
Marathon.130 Additionally, public health officials have helped with investigations into lost 
or stolen CBRNE materials and environmental protection issues, such as issues with water 
systems or foodborne-illness outbreaks.131 However, not every fusion center incorporates 
public health consultation into their operations.  
In 2012, there were 51 state/territorial fusion centers and 26 major urban area fusion 
centers.132 In a 2012 report, 33.8 percent of fusion centers self-selected “public health and 
healthcare” as a mission area applicable to their operations.133 In 2013, that number 
increased to 52.6 percent, and again to 65.4 percent in 2014.134 Unfortunately, the annual 
reports stopped discussing mission area rates in 2015; it should be noted, too, that these 
results are based on self-assessments and the number of products produced by the fusion 
centers themselves.135 Additionally, the scope of the public health and healthcare mission 
area is unknown. 
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In 2014, 48 programs engaged public health and healthcare in the 
“Multidisciplinary participation in Fusion Liaison Officer Programs”; that number 
remained the same for 2015.136 In the 2015 report, this statistic was the only reference to 
the public health discipline. In the “2014–2017 National Strategy for Fusion Centers,” 
public health is referenced twice:  
The second goal addresses the needs of those who serve the public within 
an individual fusion center’s area of responsibility. Although the vast 
majority of crimes are solved by law enforcement patrol, violent crime is 
also a significant public health issue. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 were the 
deadliest day in history for our firefighters and emergency management 
systems, and emergency medical systems are impacted by and play a central 
role in bringing elective and lifesaving assistance to emergencies daily. 
Therefore, all public safety providers must be included in—and served by—
the NNFC.137  
A key component of a fusion center’s success, as identified in the Fusion 
Center Guidelines, is the integration of government and private sector 
partners into center operations and activities, as appropriate, such as 
emergency services, criminal justice, health and public health services, 
private security, and government.138 
The information provided in these reports is helpful, but does not paint an entirely clear 
picture about specific public health integration in fusion centers.  
C. JOINT TERRORISM TASK FORCES (JTTFS) 
In addition to fusion centers, JTTFs also offer a method of formal intelligence 
gathering and sharing. Nationally, there are 104 JTTFs, which comprise 4,000 members 
from 500 state and local agencies as well as 55 federal agencies.139 These organizations 
focus primarily on terrorism and “other criminal matters related to various aspects of the 
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counterterrorism mission,” and can offer a direct input for intelligence purposes.140 Fusion 
centers and JTTFs work together “to safeguard our homeland and prevent criminal and 
terrorist activities.”141 Unlike fusion centers, there are no organized efforts to incorporate 
public health practitioners into JTTFs. These task forces have been negatively impacted by 
high levels of staff turnover, and typically do not employ public health practitioners 
because they are not sworn law enforcement officers.142 
JTTFs, much like fusion centers, use a multidisciplinary approach across various 
agencies to protect the homeland. However, they face barriers when it comes to interagency 
collaboration and, although they are staffed by law enforcement and public safety officers, 
they generally do not involve public health agencies; in 2005, Eyerman and Strom could 
identify only one JTTF that had a public health subject-matter expert on its team.143 
D’Angelo argues that, if a JTTF wishes to succeed, it must implement collaborative 
processes that leverage the multitude of resources at its disposal, and then must identify 
best practices that will help the organization streamline information sharing, “cross-
pollinate” innovation, and maximize resources that are not freely available.144 D’Angelo 
states, “Successful collaboration involves initiatives that integrate and collaborate with 
non-JTTF participants to include, but not be limited to, stakeholders representing smaller 
state and local law enforcement departments, public health, first responders, and private 
industry.”145 
In 2004, the state of California conducted a full-scale multiagency exercise that 
included more than 80 agencies, from which more than 1,000 personnel participated. After 
the DHS-sanctioned exercise, the following recommendation was made: 
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Public Health needs representation in the JTTFs, so they can be better 
prepared for responding to a WMD event. Public health officials should 
identify representation and obtain a security clearance so passing 
information to them will be without incident. Building relationships with 
law enforcement officials will also help public health be more involved in 
the circle of information as well as helping others understand the importance 
public health plays in WMD incidents.146 
Unlike for fusion centers, there is little literature that encourages JTTFs across the United 
States to involve public health practitioners, though some agencies and key players are 
suggesting that this integration would be beneficial. Although FBI field offices have WMD 
coordinators who understand public health concerns, having a public health subject-matter 
expert would bolster local JTTFs’ capabilities. 
D. CURRENT METHODS OF INFORMATION GATHERING FOR PUBLIC 
HEALTH 
Several functions are used to gather information for public health purposes before, 
during, and after an event. However, many programs responsible for these functions have 
documented gaps and have even become the target of congressional criticism. Regardless, 
the programs outlined in the section are the best avenue for public health practitioners to 
gather information during times of emergency. 
1. BioWatch  
During a bioterrorism event, the homeland security enterprise may not be 
immediately aware of an issue. To mitigate the impact to life and health, the Bush 
administration established the BioWatch Program, under DHS’s Office of Health Affairs, 
in 2001 with the intent to provide early detection of bioterrorism attacks and to assist 
decision makers, at all levels of government, by providing data that may save lives during 
a biological event.147 There are more than 30 established BioWatch Program locations in 
large metropolitan areas across the country; each is equipped with air-monitoring collectors 
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set up in undisclosed locations, both outdoor and indoor.148 These collectors draw air 
through filters that collect particulates in the air 24 hours a day, 365 days per year.149 Each 
day, the filters are collected and sent to an approved laboratory to be tested for select 
biological agents that have the potential to make the public ill. DHS believes that early 
detection can cut the illness and fatality rate in half.150 Typically, a representative from the 
local FBI field office is a part of the BioWatch Advisory Committee, which means 
information from these tests will most likely be shared with the JTTF and fusion center; 
however, JTTF and fusion center staff may not fully understand the detrimental health 
impacts of the agent in question.  
BioWatch has limitations, however, that can prevent detection of a public health 
crisis. For instance, most of the collection filters are located in highly urban areas, but not 
every urban area has a BioWatch Program. Furthermore, data is sometimes collected 
inconsistently, and the current process is not instantaneous: samples must be collected and 
tested, which can delay recognition that an attack has occurred.151 Additionally, a 
BioWatch Actionable Result may occur in an area, even if action is not warranted.152 A 
primary example of this phenomenon is the frequent tularemia bacteria positive results 
from BioWatch samples in Denver, Colorado.153 As Maron points out, the samples “were 
not false positives, they did accurately pick up tiny, background amounts of DNA from 
organisms naturally present in the environment—in effect, they were false alarms because 
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they signaled the potential occurrence of a terrorist attack when none had occurred.”154 
Larsen et al. state that a BioWatch Actionable Result “does not automatically trigger an 
immediate response from public health officials” because a response may be a “high regret” 
situation that can lead to “social, economic, ethical and public health repercussions of 
response actions.”155 In order to issue a public health response, officials need more 
intelligence; unfortunately, the BioWatch Program alone cannot offer the certainty needed 
to make definitive decisions or to request resources such as the strategic national 
stockpile.156 This uncertainty is evident to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC); before sending strategic national stockpile resources, the CDC requires a secondary 
analysis with a subsequent positive test for the agent indicated by the BioWatch sample.157  
It is important to note that the BioWatch Program was created to detect the physical 
presence of select agents. The system cannot determine the origin, the intent, or the scope 
of the agent’s existence, or whether the agent is transmissible to humans. The BioWatch 
Program does successfully detect the presence of select biological agents, but it does not 
go far enough to truly improve situational awareness.158 Public health decision makers do 
not need to know how the agent was introduced, but it is vital to know whether it occurred 
naturally or from nefarious action. In some instances (e.g., anthrax), time is of the essence; 
the longer decision makers wait for confirmation from the CDC, the greater the risk to the 
U.S. population. Adding more intelligence collection methods for public health 
practitioners not only assists the decision-making process, but may ultimately save 
American lives.  
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2. Syndromic Surveillance  
Syndromic surveillance is a method for monitoring disease among a population. 
These systems are used at the local, state, and federal levels of government with the goal 
of providing early detection of a covert bioterrorism attack. People have fallen ill can be 
tracked in the syndromic surveillance system based upon behavioral patterns, symptoms, 
signs, and eventually findings from laboratory tests.159 For example, if a nefarious action 
involving a Category A agent, such as Anthrax, is carried out, the system has the ability to 
detect a surge event of influenza-like symptomology.160 These systems also track a wide 
range of reportable diseases, which allows health departments to identify potential 
outbreaks.161 However, syndromic surveillance has limitations. Not all health departments 
and hospitals participate in syndromic surveillance programs, and urgent care centers and 
physician offices are often unaware of syndromic surveillance systems available through 
the state. Furthermore, if all medical service entities used syndromic surveillance, it may 
still be difficult to detect an outbreak. Flu-like symptoms occur in many infectious diseases 
that come from viral, bacterial, fungal, and protozoan sources; these could be easily 
confused for an anthrax-related bioterrorism event.  
3. CDC’s Situational Awareness Branch  
The CDC’s Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response has a designated 
division, known as the situational awareness branch, that works to optimize situational 
awareness during public health emergencies. This specialized team collects, validates, 
analyzes, interprets, and synthesizes critical information for key decision makers at the 
CDC who ensure the health and wellbeing of all Americans.162 In 2014, the situational 
awareness branch created Red Sky, a cloud-based software that allows users to access real-
                                                 
159 Kenneth D. Mandl et al., “Implementing Syndromic Surveillance: A Practical Guide Informed by 
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time information during emergency situations.163 Red Sky was named after an old adage: 
“Red sky at night, sailor’s delight. Red sky in the morning, sailor’s take warning.”164 Red 
Sky’s dashboard interface graphically displays public health events on a global map, with 
specific colors to denote the severity of an event.165 When the user selects an event, the 
interface displays information general information and give the user the opportunity to 
access more in-depth information.166 This software was made specifically for the CDC; 
the information within Red Sky is loaded into the software by personnel at the CDC’s 
emergency operations center (EOC). EOC staff obtain this data from both internal and 
external sources.167 Although Red Sky is CDC-centric, the previous director, Dr. Thomas 
Friedan, had aspirations to share this software with partner organizations such as the World 
Health Organization.168 Unfortunately, many stakeholders at the local and state levels may 
not be aware of this CDC capability, or they may be unable to gain access to it.  
4. BioPHusion 
BioPHusion is a CDC project that was launched in 2008 with the intent to integrate 
and further disseminate data gained from biosurveillance across the country.169 The 
purpose of BioPHusion was, and still is, to apply the concept of fusion centers within the 
public health sector to create BioPHusion centers for biosurveillance.170 BioPHusion’s 
inputs include CDC programs and open-source material from outside the agency. 
BioPHusion produces and disseminates a daily situational awareness report pertaining to 
infectious disease and natural disasters that is read by the CDC’s director, division directors 
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and branch chiefs, and select external partners. This information is shared with other 
federal partners with the goal of creating an online platform to share information in a timely 
manner.171  
The BioPHusion program “was intended to specifically allow for alert verification 
and dissemination by routinely collecting, monitoring, and synthesizing disparate kinds of 
health information into actionable knowledge in order to support public health action.”172 
This, hypothetically, would improve situational awareness and provide the knowledge key 
decision makers need—but not just for those in the public health community. Agencies 
such as DHS could utilize this data for their project purposes (e.g., BioWatch) as well. 
Khan et al. stated: 
Enhancing early detection of, rapid response to, and effective management 
of potentially catastrophic infectious disease outbreaks and other public 
health emergencies will require a bottom-up knowledge-management 
approach that synthesizes information within global, federal, state, 
territorial, tribal, and local programs. This concept of multidirectional 
information flow would rely heavily on the creation of new electronic social 
networks for knowledge management.173 
As the model in Figure 1 indicates, intelligence is submitted through multiple stakeholders 
to the federal BioPHusion center, with the goal of attaining better “situational awareness” 
and a “common operating picture.”174 
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Figure 1.  BioPHusion Information-Gathering and Sharing Process175 
A search for “BioPHusion” on the CDC’s website yields just six search results; the 
majority of the documents only briefly mention the program. However, in minutes from a 
meeting held August 5–6, 2008, it was stated that “the concept of BioPHusion was a 
priority of the CDC director, who created an Office of Critical Information Integration and 
Exchange (OCIIX) to start a BioPHusion program” and “the BioPHusion center is bringing 
information together in such a way that one does not have to review twelve sets of slides 
or twelve pdf documents in order to figure out what is needed.”176  
Much like the traditional fusion center, the BioPHusion concept, which utilizes the 
fusion center concept for public health purposes, does not provide information to local and 
state health departments. It relies mostly only publicly available information from various 
media outlets, much the same way that public health practitioners already gather 
information.177 Therefore, the BioPHusion program finds itself in the need for more 
                                                 
175 Source: Kahn et al. 
176 CDC, “Coordinating Office for Terrorism Preparedness and Emergency Response (COTPER) 
Board of Scientific Counselors (BSC) Summary Report” (report, Department of Health and Human 
Services, 2008), 13, https://www.cdc.gov/maso/FACM/pdfs/BSCCOTPER/2008080506_Minutes.pdf.  
177 Henry Rolka, Jean C. O’Connor, and David Walker, “Public Health Information Fusion for 
Situation Awareness,” in Biosurveillance and Biosecurity, 1–9 (Berlin: Springer, 2008), 2, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-89746-0_1. 
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information such as monitoring programs for environmental and vector purposes, police 
records, vital records laboratories and medical records.178 Carter et al. notes that 
BioPHusion “served as a robust source of health information, but it lacked the analytic 
capacity to synthesize this amount of information and communicate relevant information 
in a digestible and actionable format (e.g., an intelligence product).”179  
In Figure 1, there is nothing mentioned about sharing information from BioPHusion 
with local or state public health entities. This bottom-up approach makes BioPHusion 
similar to the situational awareness branch; it is mainly a federal function and it is not 
providing actionable intelligence to state or local governments.  
5. Fusion Center Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO) Program 
Fusion centers also incorporate the Fusion Center Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO) 
program.180 Public health practitioners can utilize this liaison program to receive 
unclassified information, but is not always timely or helpful, especially during a crisis. In 
many instances, information shared through this program has already been reported by 
local media before the fusion center releases the information to its liaisons. Additionally, 
this information-sharing program has a one-way information flow; it does not allow public 
health practitioners to share information if they are not members of a fusion center. 
E. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
During public health emergencies, decision makers need more intelligence to 
determine if an event is actionable. In the business community, actionable intelligence 
refers to “any intelligence that can be used to boost a company’s strategic position against 
industry peers. The acquired intelligence must be transferred into real actions which can 
                                                 
178 Rolka, O’Connor, and Walker, 2.  
179 Jeremy G. Carter and Michael Rip, “Homeland Security and Public Health: A Critical 
Integration,” Criminal Justice Policy Review 24, no. 5 (September 1, 2013): 31, https://doi.org/ 
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be used to either launch a preemptive strike or prepare a counter strategy.”181 For the 
purpose of this thesis, actionable intelligence for public health is defined as any intelligence 
that can be used to build the public health community’s level of situational awareness 
regarding any developing or present health threat. Intelligence procured by other 
disciplines must be considered to launch preemptive action, prepare a strategy for 
countermeasures, or perhaps inform the decision to take no action and continue to gather 
data. Additional intelligence will help decide whether an event is actionable or whether it 
is occurring naturally. 
BioWatch provides the clearest example of the need for additional intelligence. The 
BioWatch system in Denver provided accurate information on the presence of a pathogen, 
tularemia, but that presence alone did not necessitate a response; additional information 
was needed to judge whether or not the positive result required action.182 These false 
alarms, especially when they recur, may establish a sense of complacency. Additionally, 
as Eric Toner with the Center for Health Security found in 2009, large outbreaks of a mild 
disease can go undetected by health surveillance systems like syndromic surveillance and 
BioPHusion.183 This means important public health intelligence may go unnoticed.  
When an emergency strikes, public health leaders often rely on local news agencies 
for information. According to Lenart et al., public health agencies are often left to “validate, 
extract, and subsequently define the critical elements of information provided in official 
government communiques in the context of their response duties during an emergency.”184 
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This process produces suboptimal results and increases the chance for human error.185 The 
BioWatch program fulfills its purpose, but it does not provide actionable intelligence. To 
increase the flow of quality intelligence that improves situational awareness and public 
health decision making, public health practitioner and fusion center integration should be 
improved around the country. 
In 2007, James Morrissey surveyed 22 fusion centers, 12 of which had established 
collaborations with the public health sector.186 However, the public health positions 
offered in these 12 fusion centers were mostly “minimal,” with only one full-time 
position.187 Today, about 10 years after Morrissey’s research, it is unknown how often, 
and to what extent, public health practitioners are involved in fusion centers nationally. A 
formal system is needed to ensure that the proper public health practitioners are receiving 
relevant threat information. The lack of a current system does not mean that those in public 
health do not seek information. Public health agents do seek information; but without a 
system in place, this information usually comes from informal intelligence sources (news 
media or social media) rather than formal sources (fusion centers, local law enforcement, 
and federal law enforcement).  
Notably, the benefits of improving collaboration between the public health sector 
and fusion centers and JTTFs are not one-sided. Public health practitioners can act as 
subject-matter experts in fusion centers, especially for WMD threats such as chemical, 
biological, and radiological events.188 To gain a better understanding of the current level 
of public health integration within fusion centers and JTTFs, surveys were sent to leaders 
from public health agencies, JTTFs, and fusion centers. The following chapters discuss the 
survey methodology and results. 
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This thesis research used content analysis to determine the extent of public health 
sector integration within fusion centers and JTTFs, the level of integration, and future plans 
for collaboration. Max Weber first suggested the idea of content analysis, stating that it 
should include: media content (radio, television, mass media communication), thematic 
analysis, and quantitative argumentation quantitative analysis.189 Today, content analysis 
has taken on a more quantitative meaning.190 While qualitative analysis encompasses 
communication science, hermeneutics, social research, literary studies, and psychology of 
processing texts, qualitative text analysis is “a form of analysis in which understanding and 
interpretation of the text play a far larger role than in classical content analysis.”191 
Chapters I and II of this thesis, for example, contain qualitative text analysis.  
To collect data for this thesis, the researcher sent three separate, but closely related, 
surveys to fusion centers, JTTFs, and public health departments; the survey questions can 
found in Appendices A, B, and C. The fusion center survey asked 14–22 questions, 
depending on how the respondent answered each question. The JTTF survey contained 19 
questions, and the public health survey contained 43 questions. The surveys were built on 
the Naval Postgraduate School’s Lime Survey tool and administered online.192 They were 
conducted under Naval Postgraduate School Institutional Review Board supervision 
starting September 9, 2017, and ending on December 21, 2017.193  
The intent of the surveys was to gather data regarding public health integration 
within fusion centers and JTTFs. Using the Center for Homeland Defense and Security’s 
(CHDS) alumni directory, 41 potential respondents were selected to receive a personalized 
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email inviting them to participate in the fusion center survey. These individuals were 
selected based upon their listed occupation and/or their participation in CHDS’s fusion 
center leaders program. Additionally, the survey was sent to all 77 fusion centers using the 
national fusion center distribution list. Of the 77, 23 responded: a response rate of 
29.87 percent.  
The JTTF-specific survey was distributed to 15 FBI WMD coordinators across the 
country who participate in local JTTFs. The researcher contacted an FBI agent, who 
obtained permission to disseminate the survey among select JTTFs from FBI headquarters 
in Washington, DC. Only three of the 15 JTTFs responded (a 20-percent response rate). 
The public health–specific survey was sent to 24 public health stakeholders across 
the country who were selected from the CHDS alumni directory, or from contacts the 
researcher made at professional conferences. When the professional contacts were 
solicited, they were informed that the survey was voluntary. CHDS alumni received a 




The surveys provided significant qualitative data, as well as some quantitative data, 
that offer insight into the current integration of public health considerations within fusion 
centers and JTTFs, and help explain barriers to collaboration. It should be noted that data 
was sorted before it was coded: Fusion centers (FCs) that had public health integration 
were assigned codes FC01–FC04. Fusion centers that did not have public health integration 
were coded as FC05–FC23. Similarly, local public health agencies (LPHAs) were coded 
as PH01–PH09 and state health departments as PH10–PH16. Complete responses to each 
survey can be found in Appendices D, E, and F. A summary of the data is provided in this 
chapter. 
A. FUSION CENTER SURVEY 
Of the 23 respondents to the fusion center survey, 17 represented state fusion 
centers and six represented local fusion centers. Four of the represented fusion centers 
(FC01, FC02, FC03, and FC04) had public health representatives—two were state fusion 
centers and two local fusion centers. FC01 had nine part-time public health representatives 
(three epidemiologists, three animal health subject-matter experts, two physicians, and one 
health preparedness planner). FC02 had one full-time public health representative (a fusion 
center analyst). FC03 had one part-time public health representative (a nurse). FC04 had 
one part-time public health representative as well (a public health emergency planner). All 
of these representatives had a security clearance procured by their fusion center.  
Fusion centers were asked about the process for integrating public health 
representatives into the center. The level of commitment from FC01 is particularly 
encouraging; however, it should be noted that FC01 is home to one biosafety level (BSL) 
laboratory, and the center plans to add another BSL laboratory in the near future.194 It is 
therefore unsurprising that FC01 focuses on biological and agricultural threats. The level 
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of commitment to public health was not the same with FC02, FC03, and FC04. FC02’s 
public health representative was a statewide asset who was appointed for a heroin response 
initiative; as the respondent from FC02 mentioned, this representative provides only 
“information on drug overdoses and emergency room admissions related to opioids.” It is 
therefore unknown how skilled this individual is in terms of public health preparedness or 
public health in general. FC04 candidly discussed how difficult it is to incorporate public 
health representatives into the fusion center’s daily operations, citing funding problems and 
issues obtaining a security clearance for the public health representative.  
When asked to describe the process for integrating public health information 
provided from their public health representative, the FC04 respondent stated that they did 
not “have a need for any products.” The FC04 respondent also indicated that they had not 
experienced any benefits from public health integration, nor did they ever have reason to 
call upon the expertise of their public health representative. The FC02 respondent 
maintained the narrative pertaining to drug overdoses and opioid-related issues. When 
asked what steps are being taken to improve public health and fusion center integration, 
the FC01 and FC03 respondents discussed their plans in detail, but the FC03 respondent 
mostly spoke of issues pertaining to the medical community, not public health. The FC02 
and FC04r respondents indicated that they had no plans to improve integration between 
public health agencies and their fusion center. 
A total of 19 fusion centers, or 82.61 percent of those surveyed, indicated that they 
did not have a dedicated public health representative. Of these, 15 (78.95 percent) were at 
the state level of government while four (21.05 percent) were at the local level of 
government. Seventeen of the 19 fusion centers have discussed the inclusion of public 
health representatives, and 18 said that they value public health integration. The FC18 
respondent indicated that fusion center staff had discussed the inclusion of public health 
practitioners, but also indicated that they do not value public health integration. Of the 18 
that do value this integration, only four indicated that they have implemented 
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recommendations from the health security appendix published by the DOJ in 2011.195 A 
total of 14 fusion centers indicated that they have included public health in their TLO 
programs, while five have not. Additionally, the FC18 respondent discussed the inclusion 
of public health, but said the fusion center does not value public health integration, despite 
including a public health representative in its TLO program. The FC20 respondent said the 
fusion center has never discussed the inclusion of public health; while FC20 does value 
public health integration, public health is not a part of its TLO/ program.  
When asked about information sharing between public health agencies and fusion 
centers, fusion centers generally mentioned that information flows out, instead of public 
health information coming into the fusion center. The FC05 respondent stated, “The state 
fusion center does have an information sharing relationship with the primary state health 
officer who does provide valuable health and epidemiological information to our fusion 
center. However, this is not a formal relationship and information sharing/alerts is 
sporadic.” FC09 has a public health/hospital representative that developed a suspicious 
activity reporting (SAR) card that is carried by hospital staff, but it is unknown if the 
individual is privy to public health department meetings; the representative may therefore 
not be properly prepared to be a public health contact. Other fusion centers receive or share 
information “as needed,” “sporadically,” or during big public health incidents such as the 
Zika, Ebola, or chikungunya outbreaks. Despite not having formal relationships with public 
health practitioners, 13 fusion centers indicated that their process of sharing and receiving 
information with public health works well. Six fusion centers indicated that they are 
working to improve their information-sharing process with the public health sectors. 
Fusion centers were also asked if they were making an effort to improve public 
health collaboration. Five fusion centers indicated that they are working to improve this 
integration through a variety of methods, including improving criteria for health-related 
information sharing, obtaining security clearances, increasing health outreach to county 
health officials, and attempting to create a full-time public health analyst position. For 
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instance, FC05 recognizes operational issues and is working to eliminate the hurdles 
between public health agencies and fusion centers. The FC07 respondent indicated that the 
fusion center is trying to incorporate a part-time public health presence, an idea that came 
to fruition “several years ago.” However, in the same response, the FC07 respondent stated 
that a public health practitioner was assigned to the fusion center, but “for reasons never 
really explained, that person stopped coming and the partnership dissolved.” FC23 at one 
time had a full-time epidemiologist, but, after that individual retired, a replacement was 
never hired. Three fusion centers specifically named the lack of funding and resources as 
the main reasons why public health is not a function of their daily operations.  
Of the 19 fusion centers with no public health representatives, 17 indicated that 
they still receive public health information through informal channels, personal contacts, 
and publicly available information.196 A total of 17 centers also reported that their process 
to obtain public health information works well, while nine stated that they intend to 
improve this process. The FC18 respondent mentioned that the fusion center’s process for 
obtaining public health information does not work well, and that the center seemingly does 
not intend to make improvements.  
When asked what has prevented public health integration, the fusion centers had 
varied responses. Some reasons included politics, clearance access, public health not being 
a part of the fusion center’s scope, and leadership not recognizing the benefits of public 
health integration. The two most frequently mentioned barriers to integration were lack of 
resources and funding (mentioned by seven centers), and the public health sector’s 
disinterest in collaboration (mentioned by six centers). The FC06 respondent stated: 
The fusion center has reached out to various healthcare and public health 
sector partners on numerous occasions, offering them access and a 
workspace within the fusion center. To date, there has been reluctance on 
the part of our health sector partners to “physically” place any of their 
personnel in the fusion center—even on a temporary basis. The question 
really should be, “What has prevented the healthcare and public health 
sector from integrating with state and local fusion centers?” 
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All of the fusion centers reported that they share information about public health 
threats through the creation of bulletins and for official use only (FOUO) products, and 
that this information is shared to a wide array of stakeholders via email. Six of the 19 fusion 
centers stated that there is no time delay in sending out information, while the rest said 
some information is delayed if it needs to be vetted, or if it is not urgent in nature. However, 
when asked if the information being sent was required to be declassified, seven fusion 
centers said yes and 12 said no, which does not accurately reflect previous responses.197  
B. JTTF SURVEY 
While only three representatives from JTTFs responded to the survey, they 
provided some interesting observations. The JTTF2 respondent indicated that a public 
health representative serves on the task force—a public health emergency planner who 
holds a security clearance obtained by the JTTF. However, in a qualitative response, the 
JTTF2 respondent indicated that the public health representative does not actually “sit on 
the JTTF,” but is someone who simply shares information with the JTTF’s WMD 
coordinator. Regardless, JTTF2 has experienced benefits from this public health 
emergency planner and has called upon this person’s expertise; the WMD coordinator who 
communicates with this public health representative is usually the JTTF’s decision maker 
on matters of public health emergencies when it comes to documentation, distribution of 
information, and a decision to conduct further analysis/investigation is needed. JTTF2 
suggests that, depending on the nature of the event, information “has the potential to be 
shared with public health related entities, JTTF partners, FBI headquarters, and other 
state/federal partners deemed appropriate.” JTTF2 indicated that it does not need any 
special permissions to release information to public health officials, but it must be 
declassified before it is released.  
JTTF1 and JTTF3 do not have public health representatives, but JTTF1 has 
discussed the potential of public health inclusion. Both indicated that they value public 
health integration and still procure public health information through their WMD 
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coordinator and other liaison efforts. Both indicated that this process works well; JTTF1 
has plans to improve this process, but JTTF3 does not. When asked how the organization 
is trying to improve collaboration with public health, JTTF1 indicated that the task force 
has discussed adding public health to the JTTF, while JTTF3, much like JTTF2, has 
obtained clearances for public health subject-matter experts. When asked about barriers to 
integration, JTTF3 stated, “most JTTFs do not have non-sworn law enforcement personnel 
on the JTTF as official task force members.” In regards to sharing information about public 
health emergencies, JTTF1 and JTTF3 indicated that they first try to determine if there is 
a nexus to terrorism, and that information may be shared depending on the situation. This 
information could be shared with FBI headquarters, other JTTFs, organizations that 
comprise the JTTF, and local law enforcement agencies; information sharing occurs via 
email and briefing. Depending on the situation, there may be a time delay. JTTF1 and 
JTTF3 indicated that they do not need any special permission to release information to 
public health, but it must first be declassified.  
C. PUBLIC HEALTH SURVEY 
1. Local Public Health Agencies (LPHAs) 
None of the nine LPHAs surveyed had representatives in either fusion centers or 
JTTFs, but they all indicated that they would be interested in working with fusion centers. 
Only one, PH03, actually reached out to a fusion center; however, a subsequent survey 
answer from the PH03 respondent suggested that the agency has never specifically 
discussed collaboration with the fusion center.  
When asked how their agencies are working to improve fusion center integration, 
the survey results show no true common theme. Some LPHA representatives mentioned 
that they are working to become members of a fusion center TLO, or are working with 
fusion centers at regional meetings, but that they are often too understaffed to prioritize 
this work. Three LPHAs asserted that they depend on the state health department’s 
relationship with the fusion center. However, one LPHA asserted that the state health 
department does not pass relevant information on to local government agencies. Three 
LPHAs indicated that their fusion center has contacted them in the past regarding public 
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health threats. Additionally, fusion centers have asked LPHAs for information on topics 
such as “cyber and healthcare,” communicable disease issues, and highly infectious 
diseases, as well as information pertaining to special events.  
Six of the nine LPHA survey respondents indicated that they would be interested 
in working with JTTFs, but none of them have contacted their local JTTF. When asked 
how LPHAs are working to improve JTTF integration, seven LPHA respondents indicated 
that there are no current efforts, while one mentioned that the state health department is 
working with the JTTF; the respondent commented, “I think it is incumbent upon fusion 
centers to do a better job sharing info that is relevant to [public health]; we have had 
specific meetings on this topic.” It is important to note that the respondent mentioned fusion 
centers, rather than JTTFs, as prompted by the survey question. This may indicate 
confusion about the difference between fusion centers and JTTFs.198 Two of the nine 
LPHAs indicated that their local JTTF had contacted the health agency regarding issues of 
bioterrorism, response planning, situational awareness of public health issues, and special 
events.  
LPHAs indicated that their threat information comes from state health departments; 
communicable disease information programs such as ESSENCE, HSIN, and BioWatch; 
and fusion center TLO programs. The respondent from PH05 suggested that information 
sharing at the state level is improving, but information sharing between state agencies and 
LPHAs is not. Five LPHAs indicated that their process to obtain threat information 
functions well, but only two have exercised these processes. When asked what is being 
done to improve how the health agency receives threat information, four of the nine 
respondents indicated that there are no current plans for improvement.  
2. State Public Health Agencies 
Of the seven state health agencies that responded to the survey, four have 
representatives in a fusion center, with only PH11 indicating that its representatives have 
security clearances. However, one of the remaining three, PH15, indicated that its 
                                                 
198 This response also, however, could have been caused by survey fatigue. 
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representative is obtaining a clearance and will eventually be trained as a fusion center 
analyst. Beyond these actions, the state health agencies that have representatives in fusion 
centers are not taking steps toward improving their current level of integration. Three state 
health agencies have experienced benefits from their relationships with fusion centers; 
these three also indicated that the fusion center has contacted the agency to request public 
health expertise. With the exception of PH15, the state public health agencies that have 
representatives in the fusion center indicated that they are not working to improve 
integration.  
Similar to LPHAs, state public health agencies that do not have fusion center 
representation do have an interest in working with fusion centers, but only one has actually 
contacted the fusion center to initiate collaboration. The PH16 respondent indicated that 
the health agency has contacted the fusion center, but the fusion center decided not to 
include the agency in its operations. Additionally, two agencies indicated that they are 
taking steps to strengthen relationships with their state fusion centers; these efforts have 
centered on working relationships. The PH12 respondent stated that the fusion center 
contacted the agency for information regarding public health, such as bioterrorism, disaster 
planning, and clinical threat assessments, but that the two entities have not established 
formal relationships.  
Two state health departments, PH12 and PH16, indicated that they serve on the 
JTTF, with their representatives serving as departmental director and public health 
preparedness leadership, and both attend JTTF meetings. Only one of the respondents, from 
PH12, indicated that its representative hold a security clearance, which was obtained 
through DHS. PH12 has experienced benefits from its partnership with the JTTF, and both 
PH12 and PH16 indicated that their JTTF had contacted the agency to seek public health 
expertise.   
Out of the five state health agencies that do not have JTTF representation, four 
indicated that the agency has no interest in working with the local JTTF. One, however, 
PH14, has contacted the JTTF; but, later in the survey, the PH14 respondent’s answers 
suggest this contact may have actually been with a fusion center. The PH15 representative 
demonstrated an understanding of JTTFs and provided insight into how the health agency 
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works with its local JTTF indirectly. Three state health agency representatives indicated 
they hvae no plans to improve or establish relationships with JTTFs, with one stating, “[I] 
have limited experience with JTTFs and don’t know who or how to get engaged with 
them.” Similar to the results from the JTTF survey, the PH15 respondent stated that the 
agency’s planner works with the JTTF, “as far as info flow, but is not able to be on the 
JTTF due to not being a post-certified LE official.” The JTTF has contacted PH15 
regarding suspicious powders/packages and the BioWatch program.  
State health agencies receive threat information from a myriad of sources, such as 
their state emergency management agency, the Department of Health and Human Services, 
fusion center TLO programs, the FBI, CDC, ASPR, DHS, federal counterparts, and county 
emergency managers. Four of the seven state health agencies indicated that their process 
for obtaining threat information does not work well, but only two have tested the related 
methods in exercises. When asked what steps are being taken to improve how state health 
departments receive threat information, four indicated either “none” or “none that I know 
of.” The PH12 representative said that that the agency is improving procedures through the 
“continuous evaluation of both exercise and real-world events through after-action reports 
and corrective actions,” as well as “active networking with colleagues and partners.” The 
PH14 respondent cited improvements to existing technology and the PH15 respondent 
mentioned that the agency is working to “identify federal partners and state agencies that 
they can work with.”  
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V. DISCUSSION 
The survey results in the previous chapter point to several themes, which are 
discussed in this chapter. These themes include the level of public health inclusion in fusion 
centers and JTTFs, information sharing between entities, and a common misunderstanding 
of the roles of public health agencies, fusion centers, and JTTFs. Despite confusion 
surrounding these entities’ roles in the homeland security enterprise, they are generally 
willing to work together; they share a belief that their collaboration would be beneficial, 
though they lack the ability to establish formal collaboration.  
A. AN APPRAISAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH INCLUSION 
The public health sector has very little inclusion in the surveyed fusion centers. 
While four of the 23 fusion centers, two at the local level and two at the state level, 
indicated that they have public health representation, the actual number appears to be much 
lower—only one. FC01 is an outlier given the amount of public health integration with its 
fusion center, but this is not coincidence. The fusion center location is also home to a 
Biosafety Level III laboratory, and plans to open a Biosafety Level IV laboratory in the 
future.199 It is questionable, however, if FC02, FC03, and FC04 have a true public health 
component:  
• The FC02 respondent mentioned a public health analyst who is a part of 
the fusion center’s heroin response initiative, and whose main focus is 
collecting information on drug overdoses and emergency room admissions 
related to opioids. There was no mention of public health functions related 
to communicable diseases, highly infectious diseases, emergency 
preparedness, or bioterrorism.  
• The FC03 respondent indicated that the fusion center has a “medical 
liaison officer” (MLO); the officer is a registered nurse with fire and law 
                                                 
199 Biosafety Level III laboratories work with microbes that can result in serious health complications 
or even death when workers are exposed via the inhalation route (such as tularemia). Biosafety Level IV 
laboratories work with agents such as Ebola and the Marburg virus.  
 56 
enforcement experience who is assigned to the fusion center’s critical 
infrastructure unit. When asked how the fusion center integrates public 
health information, the FC03 respondent indicated that they obtain 
“medical/health” intelligence from county public health agencies, 
emergency medical services (EMS) agencies, local hospitals, 
emergency/disaster planners, and security managers. Additionally, this 
MLO is working closely with acute care facilities and medical 
transportation providers. While public health practitioners may work with 
EMS and hospitals, this is not a primary function of public health 
practitioners. The FC03 respondent appears to misunderstand the scope of 
public health.  
• FC04 obtained a six-month grant to bring on a public health 
representative; the fusion center is fortunate that this individual had a 
security clearance, as DHS was not interested in providing the clearance 
for a six-month assignment. Given the short time period of this 
employee’s stay, it would be a mistake to consider the employee a true 
public health representative. Additionally, FC04 does not value public 
health integration. The respondent said the fusion center has found no 
added benefit and has “not used any of [the public health representative’s] 
products.” This raises the question: What is the scope of the products that 
the fusion center produces? Additionally, according to the FC04 
respondent, the function of this public health representative is to prepare 
public health awareness bulletins for local health providers. Given these 
two statements, it is clear that there is no true integration between the 
public health representative and the fusion center; the representative 
simply disseminates information from the fusion center. Local health 
providers are typically physicians, nurse practitioners, or physician 
assistants. While public health agencies may work with people in these 
occupations, they are not considered public health practitioners in the 
homeland security enterprise.  
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Despite potentially misunderstanding the definition or scope of public health, FC03 
has established connections with individuals in the community and the homeland security 
enterprise (efforts with emergency management, hospital safety and security, and 
emergency planning meetings). While FC02 and FC04 have integration, they may need to 
readdress the type of public health information they want to use. With that said, FC02 and 
FC04 do not have plans to improve public health integration within their fusion centers. 
Five fusion centers not only do not have public health representatives on either a 
part- or full-time basis, they also do not have public health practitioners in their TLO 
programs. It appears that these five fusion centers do not have any contact with public 
health officials; it is unclear how they would operate during a public health emergency. 
This should be a concern for all disciplines in the homeland security enterprise that work 
in the same areas as these five fusion centers. 
The other 14 fusion centers indicated that their TLO programs include public 
health, but, given the responses, the real purpose of the TLO programs may be to simply 
generate a list of public health contacts to use during emergencies. Only four of these fusion 
centers, for example, indicated that they have implemented the public health baseline 
capabilities released by the DOJ in 2011; this is an interesting finding considering a large 
number of the respondents indicated that they value public health.200 There could be many 
reasons for this contradiction, such as funding, leadership issues, political issues, or even 
simple unawareness of the DOJ capabilities.  
When asked about the flow of public health information, the respondents from 
FC05 through FC23 described a myriad of processes, but all seemed to surround a central 
idea: information flows from the fusion center out to its partners, but little public health 
information flows into the fusion center. Additionally, when it comes to the distribution of 
public health information, there appears to be no established distribution criteria to describe 
who receives this information. Most of the time, this information is shared via email.   
                                                 
200 Of the four that indicated that they have implemented a portion of the capabilities, to include 
public health, three were state fusion centers and one was from a local fusion center. 
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In summary, only one fusion center (though possible two) has any type of official 
public health integration. Efforts are being made to communicate to outside partners, 
including those in the public health sector, but no public health information is being 
communicated systematically. Therefore, after more than 15 years of discussion and 
official documentation, information-sharing problems with fusion centers persist on a large 
scale. However, these problems also present opportunities for improvement. All of the 
fusion center survey respondents indicated they have a desire to work with public health 
representatives.     
B. ALTERNATE MEANS OF INCLUSION AND INFORMATION SHARING 
While information sharing between fusion centers and public health agencies may 
not be robust or regular, FC05 highlighted how a fusion center can create collaborative 
relationships even if a public health contact does not have an official role in the fusion 
center. In efforts to obtain information, FC05 has contacted individuals at the state public 
health agency. A total of 13 fusion centers indicated that their process for sharing and 
receiving information with public health works well, and six said they are working to 
improve the process. Based on the written responses, it is suspected that a number of fusion 
centers are using informal networks, personal relationships, and other workarounds to share 
information. Surely, information sharing would be much smoother and more consistent if 
formal relationships were established.  
C. EXPEDITING INFORMATION DISSEMINATION  
An unexpected finding is that not every fusion center surveyed is a 24/7 operation; 
some are not open over the weekend and may be closed for holidays, impacting their ability 
to stay up to date. This means that the local media often disseminates information faster 
than the fusion center does. For example, an official county vehicle was stolen on January 
10, 2018, and recovered the next day, January 11. The fusion center sent an email alerting 
the region to the stolen vehicle on January 11, but the follow-up email announcing that the 
vehicle had been repainted and recovered was not sent until January 16. The vehicle’s 
recovery was reported in the local paper on January 13. It is important to note that none of 
this information was classified; stolen cars are a matter of public record. Local media 
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reported both the theft and the recovery, and the fusion center reported the recovery three 
days later. It is likely that the process for sharing classified information would take even 
longer, since it would need to be declassified in order to be sent via email. 
If a fusion center is alerted to a potential public health threat and an analyst is unable 
to review this information in a timely manner, even having an established relationship may 
with the public health sector may not be beneficial. Timely intelligence is often required to 
mitigate the impact of a public health—or any other type of—emergency.  
D. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PUBLIC HEALTH AND MEDICAL 
SERVICES  
Many fusion center representatives who responded to the surveys did not truly 
understand what public health entails. The respondents frequently mentioned EMS, 
hospitals, and fire departments in their qualitative comments, which is supported by a lack 
of reciprocal awareness between public health and law enforcement agencies in general. 
The FC03 respondent stated, “The MLO is a registered nurse hired under contract to work 
in the fusion center. The current MLO has 40+ years of nursing, fire and law enforcement 
experience working in the fusion center’s area of responsibility.” Fire and law enforcement 
experience does not necessarily translate to public health experience. Furthermore, the idea 
that public health is represented by the nursing profession is antiquated.201 FC02’s public 
health liaison works mainly with the opioid crisis, and FC04’s is mostly interested in 
sharing products with healthcare partners. In fact, most of the surveyed fusion center 
representatives mentioned sharing information with healthcare partners—but this 
discussion occurred in questions specific to public health, and not all disciplines within the 
homeland security enterprise. Public health is linked to medicine, but the root of public 
health is the recognition and understanding of how environmental factors and 
socioeconomic factors influence the health populations, not just individuals. During 
bioterrorism or pandemic events, the public health sector’s role is to disseminate medical 
countermeasures, not physicians. While hospitals and doctors play a role in this, public 
                                                 
201 The master of public health degree has become the gold standard of education for the public health 
profession.  
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health agencies coordinate this response. It is important for all disciplines in the homeland 
security enterprise to recognize the role that the public health sector plays in protecting the 
homeland; public health cannot be seen as having the same role as medicine.  
E. BARRIERS TO INCLUSION  
Judging from some of the responses, it appears that several fusion centers worked 
with public health representatives in the past, but currently do not. Some have attempted 
to gain a public health representative, but public health agencies failed to appoint one. 
Three responses from fusion centers shared this narrative. For instance, as mentioned in 
the previous chapter, FC06 did attempt to obtain a public health representative, but faced 
“reluctance on the part of … health sector partners.” FC07 made arrangements to 
incorporate a public health representative. The center provided the space and paid for the 
clearance process, but the “public health agency/person dropped off the radar.” In fact, of 
the 19 fusion centers that do not have public health representation, seven indicated that the 
public health agency seemed disinterested or were unable to provide personnel. In addition 
to personnel/manpower issues, another major hurdle is funding and resources—four of the 
fusion centers cited these as primary reasons why public health representation is not 
included in the fusion center. While it is difficult to confidently say that funding is the 
primary barrier, it is likely the causal factor.  
A few fusion centers, like FC01, have established great partnerships and integration 
with public health agencies, while the majority have little or no integration. Barriers to 
integration appear to be related to funding or public health agency unwillingness, which 
may also be due to budgetary issues; budgetary issues were cited twice as collaboration 
barriers in surveys completed by public health practitioners.  
F. PUBLIC HEALTH INCLUSION IN JTTFS  
Given the survey results, it is clear that the JTTFs value the public health sector and 
the intelligence it can offer. However, it may be difficult for public health practitioners to 
find a seat at the JTTF table because they are not a sworn law enforcement officers. The 
surveys show that the JTTFs are using an informal social network to work around potential 
JTTF membership requirements to gain a better understanding of public health 
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information. It may be beneficial to open the JTTF to other disciplines within the homeland 
security enterprise. 
When comparing the JTTF and fusion center surveys, it is apparent that JTTFs have 
more autonomy to decide which information they share. Unlike fusion centers, JTTFs do 
not have to acquire special permission to release information. However, this probably is 
not an issue because the majority of their members, if not all, hold a security clearance. 
Additionally, JTTFs do not offer a TLO program that facilitates communication with 
individuals from other disciplines within the homeland security enterprise. However, if 
they choose to release information to individuals who do not serve on the JTTF, this 
information would need to be declassified. This concern was unanimous across the three 
JTTF respondents and quite different when compared to the answers from fusion centers.  
G. LOCAL PUBLIC HEALTH AGENCIES  
1. Involvement  
The LPHAs that responded to the survey are not involved in either fusion centers 
or JTTFs. While it is not surprising that there is no JTTF involvement (since JTTF 
membership is typically reserved for sworn law enforcement officers), it is surprising that 
none of the local health agencies have representatives in fusion centers. This may be 
becauase the majority of fusion centers are state fusion centers (50 of them—with the other 
27 being local fusion centers) and state fusion centers are more likely to partner with other 
state agencies. It is surprising that these LPHAs are not on the distribution list for state 
fusion centers. However, as one LPHA pointed out, the relationship between a fusion 
center and public health in the state tends to be between the state fusion center and the state 
health department. Unfortunately, it appears that the state health department is not sharing 
information from fusion centers with the LPHAs. 
2. Information Sharing 
Despite having no representation in fusion centers or JTTFs, some public health 
agencies have found ways to circumvent the informational barrier. Two of the LPHAs 
surveyed are working to add staff to the TLO program. Some local health departments 
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receive communications directly from the state fusion center. For instance, the PH05 
respondent stated, “The state department of public health is collaborating with the Fusion 
Center, but that has not occurred locally.” While none of the LPHAs have formal 
relationships with fusion centers, three indicated that fusion centers have reached out to 
them to inquire about a public health issue. The topics varied, to include public health 
preparedness, communicable diseases, and special event planning. Additionally, the PH07 
respondent stated, “We make an effort to stay informed through regular contact with 
members of the JTTF.” 
3. LPHA Interest in JTTFs 
Much like fusion centers, local health agencies seem interested in working with 
their local JTTFs, but none have actually inquired about a potential partnership. More 
importantly, it is clear from the written survey responses that there is much confusion about 
the differences between fusion centers and JTTFs. There is little LPHA action to change 
the status quo; one LPHA indicated it stays informed through a regular contact with the 
JTTF, but that contact is not an official representative serving on the JTTF.  
While JTTFs and public health agencies value each other, public health agencies 
seem unaware that the purpose of a JTTF differs from the purpose of a fusion center. For 
collaboration to be successful, both must be aware of each other’s mission. Moreover, for 
true inclusion to occur, JTTFs must allow individuals who are not sworn law enforcement 
officers to sit on the JTTF. The counterterrorism mission incorporates more than the law 
enforcement discipline.   
4. Information Sources  
When asked how they receive threat information, LPHAs indicated that they rely 
on syndromic surveillance, state public health departments, BioWatch, emergency 
management agencies, and regional coalitions. Most of them feel that their processes work 
well. However, as mentioned in Chapter II, these programs do not provide an adequate 
level of situational awareness. When asked how LPHAs are working to improve the flow 
of threat information, they frequently mentioned that they form and leverage partnerships 
with individuals from other agencies. 
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5. Barriers to Integration 
One public health agency stated that its fusion center was only interested in 
collaboration if the agency could provide a full-time representative. The PH06 respondent 
stated, “The fusion center is open to having public health within the FC, but full time. This 
is a difficult position, as you know [public health] preparedness has been understaffed and 
we cannot give up a staff [member] full time. The discussion is now surrounding can three 
or four staff split the time … this will not generate the relationship needed to maintain good 
conversations.” This is often the case, as the relationships at the personnel level among 
four staff members will be difficult to develop and some may not develop at all. These 
personnel relationships directly impact the relationship between a public health agency and 
a fusion center or law enforcement agency. 
The PH06 respondent also mentioned being understaffed, and this is fundamentally 
a budget issue. LPHAs did not mention that budget issues are a significant barrier to 
integration with fusion centers, but fusion centers repeatedly mentioned budgetary issues 
and a lack of funding as integration barriers. Two of the nine LPHAs indicated that they 
are not taking steps to improve this integration; this may be due to fears of public 
perception, budgetary issues, or other unknown factors.  
H. STATE PUBLIC HEALTH AGENCIES 
1. Involvement  
Four state health agencies indicated that they have representatives in fusion centers, 
but only one of them indicated that this representative holds a security clearance. It is 
unclear whether or not the respondents understand the concept of fusion centers and how 
representatives are required to hold at least a Secret clearance. Additionally, while the 
PH11 respondent indicated that the agency has a representative at the fusion center, the 
respondent later stated, “The fusion center has primarily just created a linkage between the 
intelligence community and the public health agency (‘knowing who to call when you have 
a question’ kind of thing).” Additionally, it appears that, although the PH15 respondent 
identified an individual as a fusion center representative, this individual may not be fully 
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integrated—the employee is still in the process of obtaining a clearance, which is required 
before the fusion center can train the employee as an analyst.  
Two state health agencies indicated that they serve on the JTTF, and it is 
encouraging to see JTTFs open up their rosters to the public health community. The two 
that serve on a JTTF are a departmental director and a public health preparedness director. 
However, it was suggested that the preparedness director did not have a clearance, which 
puts the relationship in question; a JTTF would not allow a public health planner without 
a security clearance to sit on the task force.  
2. Information Sharing 
Some state public health agencies have been able to work around the barriers of 
security clearances and discipline. The PH15 respondent stated, “Our [public health] 
planner works with the JTTF, as far as info flow, but it is not able to be on the JTTF, due 
to not being a post-certified LE official.” Additionally, PH12 and PH16 are working on 
building relationships and collaborations with fusion centers, despite not having a fusion 
center representative. Most state public health agencies mentioned trying to improve 
relationships with other agencies at the local, state, and federal level to facilitate 
information flow and maintain a quality level of awareness. However, it is unknown if 
these efforts have been successful or will be in the future.  
3. Information Sources  
Receiving timely and relevant threat information is vital for public health and 
public health preparedness. State agencies indicated that they received their data from a 
myriad of sources, such as state emergency management agencies, the Department of 
Health and Human Services, the CDC, and other federal agencies. The seven state health 
departments pointed to at least 19 specific sources of information, while also mentioning 
non-specific sources such as “federal partners.” Perhaps a fusion center partnership could 
simplify the information flow for health departments.  
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4. Commonalities between State and Local Public Health Agencies  
A common theme between LPHA and state public health agencies is an informal 
social network that utilizes existing partnerships in an attempt to forge new relationships. 
While networking is always important when dealing with public health emergencies, 
formal relationships will better facilitate information sharing and break down silos. Both 
survey groups were also unable to differentiate fusion centers from JTTFs. Finally, it 
appears that there are numerous mainstream inputs for public health intelligence; this raises 
the question: is the cumulative power of these inputs actually helpful?  
I. CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES 
1. Decrease in Integration 
When compared to a survey conducted 10 years ago, the results of this survey reveal 
a decrease in collaboration between public health agencies and the other branches of the 
homeland security enterprise. Of the 23 surveyed fusion centers, only four, about 17 
percent, indicated that they have a public health representative. Keep in mind, however, 
that only one respondent had a true element of public health integration—just 4.34 percent. 
Comparatively, a survey conducted in 2007 found that eight of 20 fusion centers, or 40 
percent, had public health representation.202 Morrissey’s research defined this individual 
as a “medical/health” representative and did not restrict it to just the public health 
profession.203 However, 17.39 percent is a significant decrease from 40 percent during a 
10-year period, especially considering that the DOJ was publishing products to help 
increase integration between fusion centers and public health agencies during this time. 
Only one of the three JTTFs that responded to the survey indicated it has a public 
health representative, but that individual does not actually serve on the JTTF. Three of the 
eight JTTFs surveyed for Morrissey’s research had a “health representative.”204 Again, 
                                                 
202 There are a number of extraneous factors. Fusion centers were still in their infancy in 2007 and the 
majority of fusion centers were in high-priority states and urban areas. Additionally, since 2007, funding 
has dramatically decreased. Morrissey, “Integration of Medical and Health Representation.”  
203 A medical/health professional may be someone in public health, EMS, or medicine. 
204 Morrisey, “Integration of Medical and Health Representation,” 30.  
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this is a marked decrease in the interactions between public health agencies and JTTFs 
since 2007.   
While public health practitioners believe there are benefits to integration with 
JTTFs and fusion centers, many public health departments fail to make the first move 
toward integration. Much like they do in their profession, they should be proactive in 
establishing these relationships and information channels. This will not only help them 
prepare for an emergency, but will enhance their situational awareness during events. 
2. Funding Issues  
Funding is being reduced, and in some cases removed, for most disciplines in the 
homeland security enterprise, making collaboration that much more difficult. An 
underlying theme among the fusion center and public health survey is lack of funding, 
manpower, and resources. The federal government has been reducing federal funds for 
fusion centers, leaving the state and local governments to cover the tab. This limits 
agencies’ ability to hire more analysts and/or public health representatives. Along with this 
funding loss is the inability to pay for the costly security clearance that each analyst must 
possess. According to a 2014 Washington Post article, a security clearance can cost almost 
$4,000 per person.205  
The same can be said for the public health sector. In 2002, Congress passed the 
Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act, which allotted 
$1 billion for the Public Health Emergency Preparedness Program (PHEP).206 The 
program funds all 50 states, eight territories, and four jurisdictions (Chicago, Los Angeles, 
New York City, and Washington, DC). In 2017, the program received only $660 million.  
                                                 
205 Brian Fung, “5.1 Million Americans Have Security Clearances. That’s More than the Entire 
Population of Norway,” Washington Post, March 24, 2014, sec. The Switch, www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/the-switch/wp/2014/03/24/5-1-million-americans-have-security-clearances-thats-more-than-the-
entire-population-of-norway/.  
206 Bhavini Murthy et al., “Progress in Public Health Emergency Preparedness—United States, 2001–
2016.” American Journal of Public Health 107, no. Suppl 2 (September 2017): S180, https://doi.org/10.21 
05/AJPH.2017.304038.  
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Funding for fusion centers is facing a similar battle as well. A November 2017 
report indicated that, since 2008, the grants that fund fusion centers have been 
decreasing.207 The State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSGP) has decreased by 52 
percent and Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) funds have decreased by 30 percent. 
The vast majority of fusion centers depend on these funding opportunities to pay for 
training and analysts’ salaries.208 Additionally, some areas have witnessed their UASI 
funds go away, causing one fusion center to eliminate 75 percent of its staff.209 
3. Difficulties Understanding Other Components of the Homeland 
Security Enterprise  
The surveys conducted for this thesis show a lack of reciprocal awareness 
surrounding public health and law enforcement, and this may be common among all 
agencies in the homeland security enterprise. While public health is related to healthcare, 
it is quite different in both subject matter and approach. For instance, public health is 
population based while medicine treats the individual. When asked about the process to 
obtain public health information, the FC09 respondent stated, “We have a Fire/EMS rep in 
the center that helps with PH issues.” This is a prime example of how the field of public 
health tends to be misunderstood throughout the homeland security enterprise.  
In the same fashion, public health officials are not clear on what a fusion center is, 
what a JTTF is, and how they are different. As previously mentioned, public health 
respondents who were asked about JTTFs continued to discuss fusion centers in their 
answers. This is most likely a consequence of information silos. Unfortunately, this will 
most likely continue until there are grant requirements and/or additional funding to 
facilitate collaboration.  
                                                 
207 Homeland Security Committee, “Advancing the Homeland Security Information Sharing 
Environment: A Review of the National Network of Fusion Centers” (majority staff report, House 
Homeland Security Committee, 2017), 10, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=805450.  
208 Homeland Security Committee, 10.  
209 Homeland Security Committee, 10.  
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4. Information Sharing  
Numerous survey respondents had issues with information sharing, at least as far 
as understanding what can and cannot be shared based upon clearances, classification 
levels, and Health Insurance Portability and Accounting Act (HIPAA) requirements. While 
the surveys indicated a strong interest in collaboration, public health agencies most likely 
do not consider information sharing a primary focus of their mission. Additionally, public 
health agencies may be hesitant to partner with law enforcement agencies due to a fear that 
their clients may not continue to seek care if their backgrounds include criminal activity or 
an illegal immigration status. Notably, public health practitioners are often unaware of the 
scope of HIPAA law and cite HIPAA as a reason why they are unable to share information 
with law enforcement. Many public health practitioners, medical professionals, and even 
law enforcement officers believe that HIPAA is basically a privacy rule that protects the 
confidentiality of Americans’ health information. HIPAA was created to govern the 
disclosure of medical information. According to the Department of Health and Human 
services, law enforcement may obtain protected health information from a HIPAA-covered 
entity (e.g., hospitals, public health agencies, etc.) without the individual’s consent during 
numerous instances, including, “an instance of whether the information may be able to 
prevent or lessen a serious and imminent threat to the health or safety of an individual or 
the public.”210 
J. SUMMARY 
The three surveys document poor integration between public health agencies and 
law enforcement functions (fusion centers and JTTFs) that play a role in the homeland 
security enterprise. There is not one specific causal reason for the poor integration. The 
parties appear to be willing to work together, but there but there is no forward momentum 
to make these desires a reality. In fact, the surveys document a decline over time rather 
than an improvement. Funding and staffing issues seem to be the limiting factor for 
                                                 
210 “Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule: A Guide for Law 
Enforcement, ” Department of Health and Human Services, accessed January 23, 2018, www.hhs.gov/sites/ 
default/files/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/special/emergency/final_hipaa_guide_law_enforcement.pdf.  
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integration. Using the themes discussed in this chapter, solutions and recommendations, 
such as funding programs and operational solutions, are proposed in the next chapter.  
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The survey results and research indicate that government stakeholders value 
integration of the public health sector within fusion centers. Although it is unclear if similar 
integration is valued within JTTFs, the three survey responses from JTTF representatives 
show that the task forces do value the public health skillset and understand how it can be 
beneficial to the counterterrorism discussion. However, fusion centers and JTFFs are 
hesitant to include non-sworn officials in their daily activities, and public health 
practitioners are likewise reluctant to work with fusion centers and JTTFs due to budget 
and staffing issues, or concerns about violating HIPAA. These issues have resulted in poor 
uniformity nationwide, with varied levels of public health integration, little collaboration, 
poor public health integration in daily law enforcement operations and, ultimately, a lack 
of information sharing between disciplines in the homeland security enterprise. 
A. POLICY SOLUTIONS 
The survey responses from fusion center representatives point to methods for 
including public health considerations in the law enforcement intelligence realm. Using 
these results as well as other research, policy proposals are outlined in this section. 
1. Policy Option One: Maintaining the Status Quo 
One policy option is to maintain the status quo—to keep current conditions the 
same. Maintaining the status quo will produce no national uniformity (between the DOJ, 
fusion centers, and JTTFs), resulting in varied levels of public health integration. For 
example, one JTTF survey respondent mentioned that the task force already works around 
the rules of who is allowed to serve on the JTTF. The task force obtained a clearance for a 
public health representative and passed information to this designated person on an ad-hoc 
basis. Working around barriers is a great way to address information sharing, but there is 
no way to ensure that every JTTF and fusion center around the country is doing this. 
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Maintaining the status quo means that fusion centers will continue to pursue some 
level of partnerships using SAR training and TLO programs. Financially, this is the most 
feasible option because there are no additional costs.211 However, without establishing and 
strengthening formal relationships between these disciplines, there is still a significant 
likelihood that public health leaders would not be able to receive important intelligence in 
a timely manner during public health emergencies. This is especially problematic because 
fusion center and JTTF leaders have no formal responsibility to share information with 
public health agencies; during a state of emergency, it is therefore unlikely to happen. The 
entire information-sharing process will be at the discretion of leadership, making this 
policy option highly subjective, with unpredictable results.   
2. Policy Option Two: Remove JTTF and Fusion Center Sworn Officer 
Requirement Nationwide   
As discussed in the previous chapter, a major hurdle for public health practitioners’ 
involvement in fusion centers and JTTFs is the requirement that representatives must be 
sworn law enforcement officers. Admittedly, many fusion centers may not require analysts 
to be sworn officers, but several have cited this as a reason why public health practitioners 
have not been included in their daily operations. However, this is the primary reason that 
public health practitioners cannot sit on a JTTF. Removing this requirement for JTTFs 
would provide an opportunity for other disciplines in the homeland security enterprise to 
participate in counterterrorism operations and remain abreast of threats at the local level. 
Removing this requirement creates an easier avenue for public health practitioner 
involvement, but funding is needed to procure security clearances and to pay for personnel. 
Without these additional funds, this program is likely to be only marginally successful.  
 
                                                 
211 With exception of the example in which the JTTF procured a security clearance for a designated 
public health official.  
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3. Policy Option Three: Have Regional Planners Act as Liaisons  
Several states—Missouri, for instance, as discussed previously—have established 
regional public health emergency planners who cover the Cities Readiness Initiative (CRI) 
region in a metropolitan statistical area (MSA). The CRI is federally funded program 
administered by the CDC, implemented to heighten preparedness in the largest U.S. 
population areas. Sixty percent of the nation’s population resides in a CRI region.212  
This regional role establishes unity and collaboration across the CRI region, and 
the representative is in constant communication with public practitioners across the region. 
Collaboration across an MSA could be achieved by utilizing the regional public health 
emergency planner to serve, at least part time, in a fusion center, and by allowing the 
planner to sit on the JTTF. Individuals in these roles are familiar with the Incident 
Command System and classified/restricted information requirements. Additionally, they 
have the education and skillset to serve as a public health subject-matter expert. There are 
72 CRI regions in the country, including the four directly funded regions of Chicago, Los 
Angeles, New York, and Washington, DC. This policy option would require additional 
funding to procure the security clearance and provide personnel costs in states that do not 
have regional public health emergency planners for their designated CRI regions. Given 
the regional scope of this position, the planner will be able to provide regional public health 
intelligence briefings to the fusion center and to the JTTF. Additionally, in the public health 
surveys, two LPHAs expressed that information does not flow well from the state health 
department. Utilizing this regional role could serve as another benefit to information-
sharing protocols between the state health department and the LPHAs in the CRI region, 
as visualized in Figure 2.  
                                                 
212 It is important to note that the scope of CRI is vaster than the BioWatch program. For instance, not 
every CRI region has a BioWatch program. For more information on BioWatch, refer to Chapter II. 
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Figure 2.  Policy Option Three: Regional Planners as Liaisons 
The CDC grant funds for CRI operations—which come from the PHEP 
Cooperative agreement—will need to increase to accommodate this solution, as 
representatives will need to be hired for all CRI regions.213  
4. Policy Option Four: Include Full-Time Public Health Representatives 
in Fusion Centers 
Fusion centers and public health agency survey respondents indicated that having 
part-time responsibilities spread among multiple public health practitioners is not ideal for 
fusion center operations. Instead, a single subject-matter expert that serves as the public 
health liaison would be of greater value to the fusion center. This may be the costliest 
solution, but it also may be the most effective one. Costs would include the annual amount 
of salary and fringe benefits for the full-time representative, in addition to the cost of the 
security clearance and subsequent renewals.214 Because these costs will most likely 
                                                 
213 In fiscal year 2016, the PHEP budget was $616,419,032 and the 2016 CRI amount was 
$47,900,025, which is 7.77 percent of the total PHEP budget.  
214 Top Secret clearances cost significantly more than Secret clearances. Additionally, Top Secret 
clearances must be renewed after five years, while secret clearances are renewed every ten years. “Security 
Clearance Q&A,” Department of State, accessed March 2, 2018. https://www.state.gov/m/ds/clearances/ 
c10977.htm. 
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increase over time, it is important to consider long-term budgeting issues to determine the 
practicality of this policy option.215 Additionally, to fully implement policy option four, 
policy option five will also need to be implemented.  
5. Policy Option Five: Replenish Grant Funds 
The fusion center and public health survey respondents indicated that funding and 
resources are integration obstacles. As previously mentioned, PHEP was once a billion-
dollar program. In 2017, however, program funding dropped to half the original amount, 
leaving many state and local public health departments unequipped with the supplies and 
personnel needed to respond to emergencies. Most, if not all, fusion centers relied upon 
SHSGP and UASI funding to cover operational expenses. However, SHSGP and UASI 
both contain less than half of their original amounts, while operating costs have increased. 
Increasing the PHEP, SHSGP, and UASI grant amounts will create an opportunity to fund 
full-time or part-time public health representatives in fusion centers around the country. 
Additionally, federal agencies such as the Department of Health and Human Services, 
DHS, and the DOJ should work together to create a pathway that allows funding, perhaps 
in a cost-sharing arrangement, to be used to procure clearances and to pay for personnel 
costs at fusion centers.  
B. RECOMMENDATION 
Policy option one is not recommended because it does not provide a pathway for 
public health and law enforcement integration at a national level; instead, policy options 
two through five are recommended.216 For JTTFs, the major hurdles are allowing non-
sworn members to sit on the task force and funding the cost of the security clearance. 
Removing the sworn-officer requirement and proving federal funds for security clearances 
would facilitate legitimate public health practitioner integration within JTTFs. However, 
these policy options do face limitations.  
                                                 
215 Salary will be based upon education, experience, and skillsets. Additionally, inflation is often 
accounted for partially through an annual cost of living raise.  
216 It should be noted that options three and four are dependent upon option five. 
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It was not until 2011 that the DOJ released guidance for including public health 
representatives in law enforcement operations; three years later, however, federal grant 
funding for fusion centers started to decrease. The PHEP fund, too, has been decreasing 
since its inception in 2002, eliminating the funding options necessary to initiative policy 
option three.  
In addition to these policy recommendations, efforts must be made to educate 
public health practitioners and law enforcement agents about their respective roles in the 
homeland security enterprise. Several public health survey respondents seemed unable to 
differentiate between fusion centers and JTTFs. Additionally, some fusion center 
respondents seemed to equate public health considerations to medical capacities; while 
their missions are similar, they have different scopes. Once homeland security stakeholders 
understand each other’s roles, it will be easier for them to integrate and work together.  
C. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Nationally, there have been some successful partnerships between public health and 
law enforcement agencies. However, more research and work are required to fully 
implement the DOJ’s 2009 goal. This large-scale work may be difficult, but it will be 
helpful to the country’s counterterrorism mission. The protection of the homeland and its 
citizens is incomplete without considering the ramifications of public health emergencies; 
this thesis offers a pathway to ensure the public health stays informed, and that it can 
efficiently share information across the homeland security enterprise. Much remains to be 
researched, evaluated, and implemented; future researchers will be exploring a field of 
public health that is still emerging, and hopefully this research will help break down silos 
among all disciplines in the homeland security enterprise.  
Future research, for example, could examine fusion centers that are currently 
satisfied with their public health partnerships, identify common themes, and share these 
best practices with fusion centers across the country. Additionally, it could be beneficial to 
research the possibility of incentivizing this type of integration in the homeland security 
enterprise. This research should examine the benefits, consequences, and feasibility of an 
incentive plan.  
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The intelligence community is implementing a new environment to share 
information, powered by software—the Intelligence Community Desktop Environment 
(ICDTE). ICDTE allows information sharing across all agencies within the intelligence 
community and can serve as an example of how information sharing improves the common 
operating picture for all parties. While this example is primarily related to technology, there 
is a common theme of information sharing that may be applicable to networking between 
public health entities and fusion centers and JTTFs. Future research could examine how 
applications such as ICDTE could be use at the local and state levels of government to keep 
intelligence stakeholders abreast of the latest information. This could provide an 
opportunity for a public health practitioner to share information with his or her fusion 
center through secure channels without being in the fusion center. This could potentially 
create less resistance to incorporating public health representatives in fusion centers due to 
staffing limitations or limited office space in fusion centers. 
An improved survey dissemination and response rate for the JTTF and public health 
surveys would have expanded the reach of the survey, thus potentially providing more 
information. While the response rates of the surveys distributed for this thesis were not 
insignificant, it is hard to draw conclusions from small samples. Additionally, an omission 
was made on the public health and JTTF surveys. Fusion centers were asked, “What has 
prevented the fusion center from integrating with public health?” A similar question should 
have been asked on the JTTF survey, and on the public health survey regarding fusion 
centers and JTTFs.  
Information silos exist across all levels of government and prevent horizontal 
information sharing between agencies.217 This, in turn, impacts the preparedness and 
response of each agency. In an attempt to mitigate silos, numerous government agencies 
have adopted policies and strategies that allow them to participate in information sharing 
pertaining to issues of drug trafficking, human trafficking, immigration, and terrorism. This 
was a major reason for the initiation of fusion centers, but as the nation’s homeland security 
                                                 
217 Information silos exist in systems (e.g., government) that do not allow information to be shared 
among parties. All data must be reported to the top, where leadership decides what information is released 
to each party.   
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enterprise has matured and expanded, it is clear that the methods of information sharing 
and the people involved in this integration must mature as well. However, many challenges 
lie ahead pertaining to information sharing between law enforcement and other disciplines 
in the homeland security enterprise, including the public health discipline. Research 
regarding the creation and implementation of protocols would be greatly beneficial so that 
homeland security leaders can use evidence-based methods to facilitate information 
sharing across the country.  
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VII. CONCLUSION 
This thesis aimed to illuminate the current level of integration between the public 
health and law enforcement sectors by measuring public health practitioners’ inclusion in 
fusion centers and JTTFs. Additionally, the thesis proposed methods for improving 
collaboration across the United States. The data from the literature and surveys indicate 
that fusion centers and JTTFs wish to collaborate with public health agencies. Published 
DOJ guidance has recommended including various disciplines in the homeland security 
enterprise. This guidance provides information on how to facilitate public health 
integration, but the majority of fusion centers have not implemented any of these 
capabilities.  
The surveys revealed that some local and state fusion centers do currently work 
with public health officials; representatives from these fusion centers reported that they 
value this public health contribution. Establishing and fostering collaboration between 
disciplines is considered a prerequisite for emergency response. Nationally, fusion centers 
must be reminded of or informed about the benefits that a public health representative 
would bring to their operations. This was the intent of the DOJ’s baseline capabilities, but 
a large portion of survey respondents indicated that they had not implemented these 
capabilities.  
While fusion centers are independent and determine their own level of involvement 
with the public health community, including incentives for incorporating other disciplines 
may increase integration. Once a partnership is established, both parties will need to agree 
to training requirements, the proper credentials, and commitment level (full time, part time, 
or ad hoc). The policy options and recommendation in the previous chapter provide a 
course toward collaboration for public health, fusion centers, and JTTF leaders. The 
inclusion of public health expertise will increase law enforcement’s ability to respond to 
all-hazards events; some fusion centers, like FC01, have already had great success 
incorporating the public health discipline. It would be ideal for the DOJ to examine the 
fusion centers that have quality public health partnerships and use their methods as best 
practices in a refreshed version of the 2008 fusion center guidance and 2011 health security 
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appendix. JTTFs seem interested in the inclusion of public health practitioners; one JTTF 
member, upon hearing about the premise of this thesis, mentioned it was a great idea and 
wondered why nobody had thought of this concept before 2017.  
The public health issues over the past 15 years serve as a reminder to both the public 
health and the law enforcement communities. Ebola, Zika, Chikungunya, H1N1, seasonal 
influenza, the anthrax letters, and the emerging discipline of gene editing are all public 
health factors that contribute to threats to the homeland’s security. Improving information 
sharing through collaborative efforts is the first step toward improving situational 
awareness and decision-making processes for public health leadership. The health 
implications of WMDs, too, are catastrophic. The faster public health practitioners are 
aware of an issue, the faster they can respond to mitigate the impact. 
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APPENDIX A.  FUSION CENTER SURVEY QUESTIONS 
• Is the fusion center at the state or local level?  
o State 
o Local 
• Does the fusion center currently have a dedicated public health representative (e.g., 
someone assigned to the fusion center on a part-time or full time basis)?  
o If YES 
 How many public health representatives are assigned to the 
organization? 
 What kind of public health practitioner is the public health 
representative? (Physician, Nurse, Public Health Emergency Planner, 
Departmental Director, Other: Please Specify)? 
 Are they full-time or part time?  
 Does the public health representative have a security clearance? 
• If yes, what type of security clearance do they hold? 
o Secret 
o Top Secret 
• If yes, which organization procured the clearance? 
 Did the public health representative receive any training to work with 
your organization?  
• If so, what type of training?  
 Has the fusion center experienced any benefits from its public health 
integration? 
 Has the fusion center had cause to call on the public health expertise 
provided by its public health representative? 
 Describe the process for integrating the public health representative?  
 Describe the process for integrating public health information provided 
by its public health representative? 
 What steps (if any) is your fusion center taking to improve public 
health and fusion center integration? 
o If NO 
 Has your fusion center discussed the inclusion of public health? 
 Does your fusion center value public health integration?  
• If so, has the fusion center adopted any of the public health 
baseline capabilities established by the United States 
Department of Justice? 
 Does the fusion center have a public health representative as part of 
the liaison program (TLO/ILO) but not assigned to the fusion center? 
• If So… 
o How often does the fusion center receive/share 
intelligence information with them? 
o Does this process work well? 
o Are there any plans to revise this process to improve it?  
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• What steps (if any) is the fusion center taking to improve 
public health collaboration? 
 Does the fusion center have public health representatives, but they 
chose not to participate? 
 If the organization does not have a public health representative, does 
your organization still procure public health information?  
 What is the process to obtain public health information?  
 Does the process work well? 
 Are there any plans to revise this process to improve it?  
 What has prevented the fusion center from integration with public 
health?   
 
• What does the organization do with information regarding a potential public health 
threat? 
o With whom is this information shared? 
 Specific agencies or individuals?  
o How is this information shared?  
o Is there a time delay in sharing this information?  
o Are special permissions required to release this information? 
o Is the information required to be declassified?  
 
• OPTIONAL: Which fusion center do you represent? 
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APPENDIX B.  JTTF SURVEY QUESTIONS 
• Does the JTTF currently have a dedicated public health representative (e.g., someone 
assigned to the fusion center on a part-time or full time basis)?  
o If YES 
 How many public health representatives are assigned to the JTTF? 
 What kind of public health practitioner is the public health 
representative? (Physician, Nurse, Public Health Emergency Planner, 
Departmental Director, Other: Please Specify)? 
 Are they full-time or part time?  
 Does the public health representative have a security clearance? 
• If Yes, what type of security clearance do they hold? 
o Secret 
o Top Secret 
• If yes, which organization procured the clearance? 
 Did the public health representative receive any training to work with 
your JTTF?  
• If so, what type of training?  
 Has the JTTF experienced any benefits from its public health 
integration? 
 Has the JTTF had cause to call on the public health expertise provided 
by its public health representative? 
 Describe the process for integrating its public health representative?  
 Describe the process for integrating public health information provided 
by its public health representative? 
 What steps (if any) is your JTTF taking to improve public health and 
fusion center integration? 
o If NO 
 Has the JTTF ever discussed the inclusion of public health?  
 Does the JTTF value public health integration? 
 Has the JTTF invited public health representatives, but they chose not 
to participate? 
 If the organization does not have a public health representative, does 
your organization still procure public health information?   If yes, 
• What is the process to obtain public health information?  
• Does the process work well? 
• Are there any plans to revise this process to improve it?  
 What steps is your organization taking to improve public health 
collaboration? 
 Is there anything else that has prevented the JTTF from integration 




• What does the JTTF with information regarding a potential public health threat? 
o With whom is this information shared? 
 Specific agencies or individuals?  
o How does the JTTF share this information?  
o Is there a time delay in sharing this information?  
o Does the JTTF require special permission to release this information? 
o Is the information required to be declassified?  



















APPENDIX C.  PUBLIC HEALTH SURVEY QUESTIONS 
Potential Questions for Public Health Leadership 




• Does your department have representatives in fusion centers or the local JTTF? 
o If YES 
 How many public health representatives work in the fusion center? 
• Do these individuals work full time in their role with the 
fusion center? 
• What roles do these representatives hold within the the 
public health agency? (Physician, Nurse, Public Health 
Emergency Planner, Departmental Director, Other: Please 
Specify) 
• Do any of these public health representatives hold a 
security clearance? 
o If yes, what type of security clearance do they hold? 
 Secret 
 Top Secret 
o If yes, which organization procured the clearance? 
• Have any of the public health representatives received any 
training to work with a fusion center?  
o If so, what type of training?  
• Has public health experienced any benefits from its fusion 
center integration? 
• Has public health been asked by the fusion center to 
provide public health expertise? 
• Has the public health representative(s) expressed any 
challenges integrating the fusion center?  
• What steps (if any) is your department taking to improve 
public health and fusion center integration? 
 
 How many public health representatives work in the local JTTF? 
• Do these individuals work full time in their role with the 
JTTF? 
• What roles do these representatives hold within the public 
health agency? (Physician, Nurse, Public Health 
Emergency Planner, Departmental Director, Other: Please 
Specify) 
• Do any of these public health representatives hold a 
security clearance? 
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o If yes, what type of security clearance do they hold? 
 Secret 
 Top Secret 
o If yes, which organization procured the clearance? 
• Have any of the public health representatives received any 
training to work with a JTTF?  
o If so, what type of training?  
• Has public health experienced any benefits from its JTTF 
integration? 
• Has public health been asked by the JTTF to provide public 
health expertise? 
• Has the public health representative(s) expressed any 
challenges integrating JTTF?  
• What steps (if any) is the department taking to improve 
public health and JTTF integration? 
 
o If NO 
 Have you and your team discussed collaboration with fusion 
centers?  
 Have you and your team discussed collaboration with JTTFs?  
 Is there an interest to work with Fusion Centers? 
 Is there an interest to work with JTTFs? 
 Has public health contacted fusion centers, but they decided to not 
include public health?  
 Has public health contacted JTTF, but they decided to not include 
public health?  
 What steps (if any) is your department taking to improve public 
health and fusion center integration?  
 What steps (if any) is your department taking to improve public 
health and JTTF integration?  
 Does the fusion center ever contact you for information regarding 
public health?  
• Regarding public health threats? 
• Regarding bioterrorism? 
• Regarding response planning? 
• At all? 
• If the response was yes to any of the questions above, what 
specific information do the Fusion Centers typically 
request?  
 Does the JTTF ever contact you for information regarding public 
health?  
• Regarding public health threats? 
• Regarding bioterrorism? 
• Regarding response planning? 
• At all? 
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• If the response was yes to any of the questions above, what 
specific information do JTTFs typically request?  
 
• How does public health receive threat information? 
o Does the department feel that the process to obtain intelligence about 
credible threats work well?  
o Has this process been tested by the department in exercise situations?  
o What steps (if any) is the department taking to improve how it receives 
threat information?  
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APPENDIX D.  FUSION CENTER SURVEY RESULTS 


























State: 17 (73.91%) 
Local: 6 (26.09%) 
 
Q2: Does the fusion center currently have a dedicated public health representative 

























No = 19 (82.61%) 




The following set of questions apply to those that have public health representatives in 
their fusion centers. Questions from those that do not have public health representatives 
start on page five. 
 







Q4: What kind of public health practitioner is the public health representative? 
 
FC01: Three Epidemiologists, Three Animal Health Subject Matter Experts, Two 
Physicians, One Public Health Preparedness Planner 
FC02: Analyst 
FC03: Nurse 
FC04: Public Health Emergency Planner 
 














Q7: If the public health representative has a security clearance, which organization 
procured the clearance (Fusion Center or Public Health Agency)? 
 
FC01: Fusion Center 
FC02: Fusion Center 
FC03: Fusion Center 















Q9: If so, what type of training? 
 
FC01: All participants receive annual Intelligence Oversight training. Some members have 
received specific intelligence training. 
FC02: N/A 
FC03: Basic Intelligence and Threat Analysis Course 
FC04: N/A 
 








Q11: Has the fusion center had cause to call on the public health expertise provided 







Q12: Describe the process for integrating the public health representative into the 
fusion center. 
 
FC01: One of our three focus areas is Biological and Agricultural threats. As such, we have 
developed our Bio and Ag Threat Team. This teams consists of about 20 [subject-
matter experts] ranging from Epidemiologists, to medical doctors, animal health 
experts, etc. Each team member has a TS/SCI clearance facilitated through the 
Fusion Center but with a variety of sponsoring agencies (primarily DHS and FBI).  
 
The team meets once a month. The Fusion Center analysts provide the content of 
the briefing/discussion for the meeting and the Bio Team then discusses, asks 
questions, analyzes, and provides expert input related to the intelligence 
information. The team participants, in many cases, are not just local experts, but 
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national and sometimes world-wide experts in their respective fields. This subject 
matter expertise matched with otherwise unavailable intelligence information 
provides tremendous value not only to state policy makers, but also the federal 
Intelligence Community. The Bio Team has provided input to multiple classified 
intelligence reports (both IIRs and finished products) as well as unclassified 
bulletins that are produced on a bi-monthly basis. The team has also directly 
influenced policy decisions at the state level. They are able to do this due to the 
unique nature of our Fusion Center construct. That is, we as the Fusion Center 
provide the relevant intelligence information, and they as the subject matter experts 
provide unique and valuable insight regarding the subjects in focus. 
 
FC02: The position is a public health analyst assigned to fusion centers as part of the heroin 
response initiative.   
 
FC03: The representative is classified as an analyst with the title of Medical Liaison 
Officer. The MLO is assigned to the Critical Infrastructure Unit. 
 
The MLO is a registered nurse hired under contract to work in the fusion center. The 
current MLO has 40+ years of nursing, fire and law enforcement experience working 
in the fusion center’s area of responsibility. 
 
FC04: Our process was actually pretty difficult and remains difficult. The position is grant 
funded. Half of the grant is funded by Homeland Security and the other half by the 
health department. Another problem was the health reps security clearance. Since 
his grant is only for 6 months, the Homeland Security Department doesn’t see any 
value in obtaining and paying for the background investigation for the security 
clearance. The health rep has a clearance from a prior position. That complicated a 
lot of admin procedures. The health rep has a desk within the fusion center outer 
office. He is responsible mainly for developing public health awareness bulletins for 
local health providers. 
 
Q13: Describe the process for integrating public health information provided by its 
public health representative. 
 
FCO1: I believe this is addressed in the previous question but feel free to reach out if 
something needs clarified.  
 
As a side note, if you are interested in visiting in learning more about our unique 
approach to integrating public health into our fusion center concept, we would 
welcome a visit if you have time and would gladly share more. It may be an 
interesting case study for you. 
 
FC02: Looks to collect information on drug overdoses, emergency room admissions related 
to opioids.   
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FC03: Medical/Health intelligence is obtained from open source/news outlets, county 
public health and Emergency Medical Services Agency and from local hospital 
emergency/disaster planners and security managers. 
 
This intelligence/information is relayed to the fusion center personnel via several 
different ways. Routine or non-critical medical information can be shared at a twice 
weekly “stand-up” round table meeting of all fusion center units and personnel. 
Urgent information is shared by closed list, secured email to all fusion center 
personnel. 
 
Information to be shared with fusion center personnel and medical community in the 
area of responsibility is relayed in a “Medical Situational Awareness Bulletin” 
which is distributed on an approved recipient email list. 
 
The MLO will provide a report at the monthly Terrorism Liaison Officer’s meeting 
hosted by the fusion center for law enforcement and fire TLO’s. 
 
FC04:  Our fusion center has really not used any of his products. He is communicating 
directly with the health organizations and developing products for them. I think it is 
simply because we didn’t have a need for any products up to this point. 
 
Q14: What steps (if any) is the local or state fusion center taking to improve public 
health and fusion center integration? 
 
FC01: We are continuing to work on fully integrating our public health partners. A 
significant part of this is facilitating access (clearances) for the right participants. 
Our approach truly is a team focus. In the past year, our unclassified product 
provides for greater information dissemination. This is helpful for those public 
health officials not cleared to participate on the team. The real benefit of the group 
is being able to inform and policy makers and provide subject matter expertise back 




FC03: The MLO regularly attends meetings and committees hosted by the county’s Health 
Care Agency and the Operational Area’s Emergency Management Office. 
Additional ad hoc meetings are attend when they integrate or affect the local acute 
care hospitals, clinics and medical transportation providers.   
 
Upon hospital invitation, the MLO will attend hospital safety and security, disaster 
preparedness and emergency planning meetings. 
 




The following set of questions pertain to fusion centers that do not have public health 
representatives in their fusion centers.  
 























Yes = 17 (89.48%) 
 






















No = 1 (5.26%) 
Yes = 18 (94.76%) 
 
Q5: If so, has the fusion center adopted any of the public health baseline capabilities 



























Q6: Does the fusion center have a public health representative as part of the liaison 






















No = 5 (26.32%) 
Yes = 14 (73.68%) 
 
Q7: How often does the fusion center receive/share intelligence information with 
public health? 
 
FC05: Participation with the State Department of Health [Fusion Center Liaison Officer 
(FLO)] is not regularized and usually occurs when a particular issue or situation 
arises and the FLO contacts the fusion center.229    
 
The state fusion center does have a information sharing relationship with the primary state 
health officer who does provide valuable health and epidemiological information to 
our fusion center. However, this is not a formal relationship and information 
sharing/alerts is sporadic. 
  
FC06: The State Fusion Center has an analyst who regularly collaborates with healthcare 
and public health sector partners, and evaluates how we can better share health-
related information.   
 
FC07: AS needed, if/when there is information specific to that AOR, or when collecting 
public health information/data for projects or publications. 
 
FC08:  N/A – did not receive the question. 
 
FC09: The PH Rep receives all FOUO information. With the assistance of the hospital/PH 
rep, we developed a SAR card that is carried by hospital staff so as to assist with 
what should be reported and to whom report SAR’s too. 
 
FC10: Intermittently.   Always during health issues such as the Zika Virus, Chikungunya, 
Ebola, etc. At one point CFIX had an analyst that supported the Emergency Services 
                                                 
229 Fusion center liaison officer (FLO) is another common name for terrorism liaison officer (TLO) 
programs. 
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Sector (ESS) which included public health. She wrote numerous products on health 
issues.  
 
FC11: Ad hoc basis based on events, requests for information, or current pandemic/public 
health developments. 
 
FC12: N/A – did not receive the question. 
 
FC13: /A – did not receive the question. 
 
FC14: Weekly to provide updates as to how many people in our state are infected with 
certain diseases/illnesses. These updates are briefed to our Governor. Additionally, 




FC16: Virginia Fusion center receives or shares information with the Dept. of Health 
several times a week. Leadership from the Department of health attend a monthly 




FC18: Weekly open source documents 
 
FC19: The primary focus at this time is supporting a Drug Monitoring Initiative (DMI). 
This functions as a periodic or as needed collaboration based upon the goals and 
objectives of DMI. 
 
FC20: N/A – did not receive the question. 
 
FC21: N/A – did not receive the question. 
 
FC22: Not scheduled but happens as deemed necessary by either party. This occurs three 
to four times per month on average and varies depending on circumstances. For 
example, more data exchange occurs during Zika season or during times of unusual 
health-related events such as the last Ebola outbreak. Information related to medical 
surveillance that may impact fusion center stakeholders is also shared on an as-
needed basis. 
 
FC23: Sporadically  
 
Response Provided = 14 (73.68%) 




Q8: Does this process work well? 
 
Please note that Q8 is a continuation of Q6. If the respondent provided the answer of no 






















No = 1 (7.14%) 
Yes = 13 (92.86%) 
N/A = 5 
 
Q9: Are there any plans to revise or improve this process?  






















No = 8 (57.14%) 
Yes = 6 (42.86%) 
N/A = 5  
 
Q10: What steps (if any) is the fusion center taking to improve public health 
collaboration? 
 
FC05: We are in a preliminary stage with developing a set of criteria for health-related 
information sharing.   
 
FC06: The fusion center has been working with DHS to get SECRET-level security 
clearances for three individuals from the State Department of Health, so that they 





FC07: Would like to incorporate at least a part-time physical presence with public health 
in this center. Steps were taken several years ago, with a person from public health 
actually assigned to the center. For reasons never really explained, that person 
stopped coming and the partnership dissolved. 
 
FC08: N/A – did not receive the question. 
 
FC09: Regular communication. Enrolled in Infraguard. 
 
FC10: We would like to have a health representative but resources are scarce. 
 
FC11: Center is conducting additional outreach to county health officials. FC has already 
included a state health official on its senior advisory board.   
 
FC12: N/A – did not receive the question. 
 
FC13: N/A – did not receive the question. 
 
FC14: No steps taken. Collaboration is sufficient at this time. 
 
FC15: Attempt to have an analyst assigned to the center. 
 
FC16: Respondent Responded with “N/A.” 
 
FC17: Simply maintaining communications. 
 
FC18:  Not talking 
 
FC19: The Department of Public Health has been offered a larger role in the center. We 
would welcome a full or part time analyst. PH will be making a determination as to 
their level of commitment. 
 
FC20: N/A – did not receive the question. 
 
FC21: N/A – did not receive the question. 
 
FC22: No formal steps at this time. This fusion center would like a health analyst to be 
assigned to it on a full-time basis; however, budgets and manpower challenges 
prevent this from occurring at this time. 
 
FC23: The fusion center had a full-time epidemiologist who has since retired. It is hoped 





























Yes = 1 (5.26%) 
 
Q12: If the organization does not have a public health representative, does the fusion 






















No = 2 
Yes = 17 
 
Q13: What is the process to obtain public health information? 
 
FC05: Our process to gather health related information is somewhat informal. We can 
reach out to known individuals at various state public health agencies and usually 
this communication will meet our information needs. 
 
FC06: Our analyst carries out regular collaboration with the State Department of Health, 
local public health, FEMA regional healthcare coalition, and healthcare and public 
health sector personnel who have been selected and trained as Fusion Liaison 
Officers (FLOs). Our analyst also has access to various health-related communities 
of interest (COIs) on HSIN, receives emergency alerts from the SECURES system, 
as well as weekly or monthly newsletters from regional health sector partners, and 
periodic Emails from The Lancet and JAMA Network. 
 




FC08: One of our Analysts is a former Public Health analyst who still has contacts 
 
FC09: Maintain contact list with subject matter experts to receive information. We have a 
Fire/EMS rep in the center that helps with PH issues. 
 
FC10: Health and hospital ILOs share information with fusion center regularly as issues 
arise.   All information is shared virtually.   Public health partners also provide 
training at our ILO classes and to our regional partners as issues arise.    
 
FC11: Center received public health information via an established liaison from state 
department of health.   
 
FC12: state Vital Statistics 
 
FC13: Although there is no State Public Health Representative assigned to the State Fusion 
Center, we collaborate with the Health Department on a regular basis to share 
information. One of the analysts in the State Fusion Center has developed a good 
relationship with Health Dept staff and attends meetings and shares information on 
a regular basis. 
 
FC14: Usually by email to individuals. We also receive bulletins from the state’s Dept of 
Public Health. 
 
FC15: Usually through our connection to the department of health and senior services who 
we are working with. 
 
FC16: Developed relationships with partners in the Dept. of health. Inclusion of DOH staff 
in development of health-related intel products and joint critical incident exercises. 
 
FC17: liaison with known persons in the field. 
 
FC18: Reach out to state level DOH rep. 
 
FC19: Analyst to analyst coordination. 
 
FC20: If needed we reach out to the USAI Representative & public health working group 
to obtain the needed info. Work with the Michigan HIDTA who has a Public Health 
Rep. on staff. 
 
FC21: Through our Emergency Management Division. 
 
FC22: An executive from the state department of health sits on the Advisory Board 
governing the fusion center. This cements the relationship between the two 
organizations and encourages the exchange of pertinent information. Currently, the 
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process to obtain health information is to rely on the Department of Health to share 
information with the Fusion Center that deems to be important. 
 
FC23: Routine information sharing at the state level of government and through the state 
level of homeland security 
 






















No = 2 (10.53%) 
Yes = 17 (89.47%) 
 

























One fusion center that said the process didn’t work well in Q14, indicated in Q15 that there 
are no plans to improvement the process.  
 
Q16: What has prevented the fusion center from integrating with public health?  
 
FC05: Politics is often a challenge. Another challenge is sharing sensitive public health 
information that the public health agency owner may not want to reveal dues to concerns 
about public release of the information or due to internal policies that prohibit information 
sharing with another agency. 
 
FC06: The fusion center has reached out to various healthcare and public health sector 
partners on numerous occasions, offering them access and a workspace within the fusion 
center. To date, there has been reluctance on the part of our health sector partners to 
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“physically” place any of their personnel in the fusion center—even on a temporary basis. 
The question really should be, “What has prevented the healthcare and public health sector 
from integrating with state and local fusion centers?” 
 
FC07: We made arrangements to bring public health in to this center. space was provided, 
clearances were processed, and the public health agency/person dropped off the radar. 
 




FC10: Public health has not provided a representative to be co-located at the fusion center.   
 
FC11: Lack of dedicated billet to staff a public health liaison. Also, general 
misunderstanding/misapplication of HIPAA and patient confidentiality laws have 
prevented health departments and health service organizations from sharing relevant health 
information with the center.   
 
FC12: Lack of resources:  Manpower/time/ease of contact 
 
FC13: Budget constraints have not allowed the Health Department to embed personnel at 
the State Fusion Center. One of the analysts in the Fusion Center attends meetings and 
collaborates with Health staff on a regular basis. 
 
FC14: Budget/staffing issues. We only have five analysts in our fusion center for the entire 
state. Our critical infrastructure analyst is responsible for working with public health. The 
healthcare & public health sector is one of 16 other critical infrastructure sectors that she 
is responsible for having visibility on. She’s the only infrastructure analyst in our office, 
so it is hard to dedicate the time needed to effectively integrate with public health. 
 
FC15: I do not know for sure but I would say will to provide personnel on health’s part. 
 
FC16: Respondent responded with “N/A.”  
 
FC17: Commitment of personnel by the healthcare sector 
 
FC18: Lack of knowledge of potential use as well as ongoing problem of fusion center still 
considered an all crimes center 
 
FC19: Public health’s willingness to make the assignment to the center. 
 
FC20: Lack of federal funds. 
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FC21: At this time our fusion center focuses on criminal investigations and require 
commissioned personnel who is capable of filing criminal charges. The public sector does 
not meet these criteria. However, we are still willing to work with them to solve issues. 
 
FC22: Budget limitations and lack of manpower to create a dedicated health analyst to be 
embedded with the fusion center. 
 
FC23: It does integrate, there are always ways to improve and the fusion center encourages 
new ways of thinking to better meet the information sharing needs of the future. 
 
 
Q17: What does the organization do with information regarding a potential public 
health threat? 
 
FC05: The fusion center will coordinate with the respective public health agency (usually 
the state), and have that agency provide to us a product that meets their information 
release framework and policy. This way the fusion center can act as an information-
sharing hub and disseminate the information on behalf of the public health agency. 
 
FC06: The fusion center regularly shares the following types of information and finished 
intelligence with its healthcare and public health sector partners to include: 
 
• Producing/sharing intelligence or information regarding suspicious incidents at 
hospitals and other healthcare facilities 
 
• Producing/sharing intelligence or information regarding terrorism and cyber 
threats to the healthcare and public health sector 
 
• Posting alerts on HSIN regarding food recalls due to contamination or food-borne 
illnesses 
 
• Provide state and local officials with health-related information prior to traveling 
overseas on official business, as part of a broader and more comprehensive travel 
security briefing 
 
• Recently worked with CDC and state and local healthcare and public health sector 
partners to produce a reference graphic on “health concerns and tips for staying 
healthy during international travel.” 
 
FC07: Depends on the information. We have assisted in locating a contagious subject that 
walked away from treatment against medical advice. We have also provided 
published information on public health threats directly to the public health agency, 
requesting that they push it to their relevant partners. 
 
FC08: Distribute as necessary 
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FC09: We help disseminate information to local government public health and work with 
state fusion center to send out information for state public health. 
 
FC10: Share with partners as needed. Partners include law enforcement, first responders, 
emergency services sector, corrections, transportation, private sector and CIKR in 
Central Florida.   
 
FC11: Ensure situational awareness among state leadership and - if warranted - 
dissemination awareness and officer safety, mitigation, and response information 
to first responders in state. 
 
FC12: Produces strategic product for statewide/nationwide dissemination to the IC. 
 
FC13: Staff at the Health Dept and at the Fusion center share information on a regular basis 
so that if something arises they know who to call, questions to ask, etc. 
 
FC14: Depends on the severity. Something smaller in our state, such as Zika that only 
results in a handful of cases in the state, we would probably push out an awareness 
message on our social media as well as share that information with our partners on 
our secure information sharing portal. If it was a massive outbreak of an illness, 
the timing at which we would distribute this information would certainly be more 
immediate. 
 
FC15: Usually just situational awareness. 
 
FC16: Creation of FOUO products which can be shared with private and government 
officials. 
 
FC17: provides briefings to stakeholders 
 
FC18: Reach out to doh 
 
FC19: See DMI explanation.  
 
FC20: Disseminate to Fusion stakeholders via email  
 
FC21: It depends on the type of information and who the information is received from. It 
can be disseminated to commission personnel as needed for officer safety 
awareness. 
 
FC22: Share with FOUO partners. These include health, fire, EMS, law enforcement and 
others involved in public safety who have a relationship with the VFC. 
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FC23: It depends on the information and the audience but it will likely be incorporated into 
a bulletin or joint intelligence bulletin (JIB) or some other form of dissemination 
such as regional homeland security committees, boards, training, exercises etc. 
 
 
Q18: With whom is this information shared (Specific agencies or individuals)? 
 
FC05: The fusion center will share information at the appropriate determined level. This 
could be wide dissemination to FOUO partners (usually the case) or strictly limited, 
such as producing information for an IIR (DHS sensitive shared product). 
 
FC06: The fusion center shares information and finished intelligence products with all of 
our healthcare and public health sector partners throughout the state. 
 
FC07: State Department of Health Director, Deputy Director and Associate Branch Chief 
of Preparedness & Response, Trauma, Preparedness, & EMS Branch 
 




FC10: We support 9 counties and have nearly 500 Intelligence Liaison Officers (ILOs - 
multi-discipline, multi-agency) who are encouraged to share it with their partners 
with a need and right to know. 
 
FC11: S&L police agencies, fire/EMS, federal partners, state leadership.   
 
FC12: statewide law enforcement and administration 
 
FC13: Stakeholders with the need to know and who are potentially impacted. 
 
FC14: Federal, state and local partners, which also include law enforcement, fire, 
emergency management and private sector. 
 
FC15: Some shared with Intelligence Liaison Officers 
 
FC16: Local, state fire agencies, hospitals, EMS, local government officials, local health 
care providers. 
 
FC17: FD, EMS, Health hospital corp 
 
FC18: State doh rep for hospitals 
 
FC19: The products developed are shared at the For Official Use Only level and shared in 
a cross-discipline manner. 
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FC20: As needed 
 
FC21: Department of Health and Human Services 
 
FC22: Federal, state and local law enforcement partners in the state. 
Fire Service in the state 
EMS 
Public Health 
Federal, state and local government officials within the state 
Other fusion centers within the National Network of Fusion Centers 
 
FC23: Both agencies and individuals based on criteria above. LE, Fire EM, Hospitals, and 
private sector 
 
Q19: How is this information shared? 
 
FC05: Normally via email. 
 
FC06: Typically, the fusion center disseminates information, alerts, and finished 
intelligence products via HSIN and the Northwest Warning, Alert, and Response 
Network (NWWARN). 
 






FC10: Virtually through electronic alerts, and bulletins. Also shared through in person 
briefings as needed. 
 
FC11: Via fusion center alerts, weekly products, or direct outreach. 
 




FC14: If it’s open source information, via email. Any information that is more sensitive in 
nature would be uploaded in our secure information sharing portal, the Homeland 
Security Information Network (HSIN), owned by DHS. All of our partners have 
the ability to have accounts on this site. 
 
FC15: Post on website and notification via email. 
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FC16: Formally through creation of intelligence products and informally through existing 
relationships. 
 
FC17: liaison exchange - briefings 
 
FC18:  Email or conference call 
 
FC19: As drug abuse threats are identified or emerging trends/patterns are recognized. 
 
FC20: Email or via telephone. 
 
FC21: Via email and phone call. 
 
FC22: Email. HSIN (Homeland Security Information Network) 
 
FC23: As noted above. 
 
Q20: Is there a time delay in sharing this information? 
 
FC05: Not usually. But we do not receive many public health related information products 
to disseminate. 
 
FC06: There can be a delay, as our Fusion Center is not operational 24/7. While alerts can 
be disseminated on the weekend and after hours, information sharing may be 
delayed. 
 






FC10: We are not a 24/7 center so time delays would equate to evening and weekend hours. 
 




FC13: Weekends/nights info may be slower to get out due to the fact that we are not a 24/7 
Fusion Center but it will get out if necessary. 
 
FC14: Depends on the severity. Ranges from as soon as we get the information to every 
two weeks when we send out links to documents we’ve uploaded on HSIN. All 
documents that we’ve uploaded on HSIN can be accessed at any time by our 
partners, but we email links to those products out biweekly just as a convenience. 
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FC19: Data collection can be difficult due to the lack of data reporting standards across the 
state for drug abuse/overdose details needed. 
 






FC23: There are always time delays due to vetting information, determining appropriate 
audience, determining mode of dissemination etc. All efforts are made to 
disseminate as quickly as possible given the challenges 
 
 























No = 11 (57.89%) 
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APPENDIX E.  JTTF SURVEY RESULTS 
Q1: Does the JTTF currently have a dedicated public health representative (e.g., 
someone assigned to the fusion center on a part-time or full time basis)? 
 




The following set of questions apply to those JTTFs that have public health 
representatives. Questions from those that do not have public health representatives start 
on page 114. 
 




Q3: What kind of public health practitioner is the public health representative? 
 
JTTF2: Public Health Emergency Planner 
 




























Q10: Has the JTTF ever had cause to call on the public health expertise provided by 




Q11: Describe the process for integrating the public health representative. 
 
JTTF2: The WMDC in particular, keeps an open line of communication and contact is 
made on a regular basis. Contact is often the result of the PH rep and the WMDC 
being on the same task forces, working groups, committees etc. The PH rep does not 
sit in the JTTF. If JTTF get intel which is related to PH matters, the WMDC will 
reach out directly to the PH rep to pass the intel and/or consult on the matter. 
 
Q12: Describe the process for integrating public health information provided by its 
public health representative. 
 
JTTF2: PH related info is generally passed to the JTTF through the WMDC, who then 
decides the appropriate action and whether the information is appropriate for 
documentation in FBI databases. The JTTF, through the WMDC is also included on 
data distributions generated by PH (such as surveillance data) for situational 
awareness. 
 
Q13: What steps (if any) is your JTTF taking to improve public health and fusion 
center integration? 
 
JTTF2: Constant and ongoing liaison, joint training. 
 
Q14: What does the JTTF do with information regarding a potential public health 
threat? 
 
JTTF2: JTTF, usually the WMDC, evaluate the information to decide appropriate actions 
(documentation, distribution, further analysis and/or investigation). 
 
Q15: With whom is this information shared? 
 
JTTF2: Dependent on the nature of the information but it has the potential to be shared 
with numerous local PH related entities, other JTTF partners, FBIHQ elements and 





Q16: How does the JTTF share this information 
 
JTTF2: Depending on the format of the intel, it can be shared electronically, in person or 
via telcal. 
 
Q17: Is there a time delay in sharing this information?  
 
JTTF2: That really depends on the nature of the info, but there certainly can be. 
 













The following set of questions apply to those JTTFs that do not have public health 
representatives. 
 















Q5: If the organization does not have a public health representative, does your 





Q6: If Yes, what is the process to obtain public health information?  
 
JTTF1: Our agency would use the FBI WMD Coordinator as a liaison between the JTTF 
and Public Health. 
JTTF3: Typically, through liaison efforts and activities. 
 










Q9: What steps is your organization taking to improve public health collaboration? 
 
JTTF1: We have discussed adding a public health person to the JTTF. 
 
JTTF3: We have had certain member of PH obtain clearances. 
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Q10: Is there anything else that has prevented the JTTF from integrating with public 
health? 
 
JTTF1: Not that I am aware of. 
 
JTTF3: This is integration in the form of meetings, info sharing, response activities. Most 
JTTF do not have non-sworn law enforcement personnel on the JTTF an official task force 
member. 
 
Q11: What does the JTTF do with information regarding a potential public health 
threat? 
 
JTTF1: Assuming the information came from public health, one of the first things we do 
is try to determine if this is a naturally occurring event or might it have a connection 
to terrorism or criminal activity. 
 
JTTF3: It is entered into Guardian as an assessment to determine a nexus to terrorism. 
 
Q12: With whom is this information shared? 
 
JTTF1: Depends. Maybe the WMD Directorate at FBIHQ. Maybe other JTTF’s. If it’s 
something that merits the JTTF’s attention, we might reach out to local law 
enforcement at the point of origin. 
 
 
JTTF3: JTTF member from other organizations. 
 
Q13: How does the JTTF share this information? 
 
JTTF1: Depends. Email and phone are probably the most common. 
 
JTTF3: Routing briefs and joint cases. 
 
Q14: Is there a time delay in sharing this information?  
 


















APPENDIX F.  PUBLIC HEALTH SURVEY RESULTS 


















Local = 9 (56.25%) 
State = 7 (43.75%) 
 



















No = 12 (75%) 
Yes = 4 (25%) 
 




















No = 14 (87.5%) 








The following questions and response are from local public health agencies. 
 












No = 3 (33.33%) 
Yes = 6 (67.67%) 
 












No = 0 (0%) 
Yes = 9 (100%) 
 
Q6: Has public health contacted fusion centers, but the fusion center decided to not 












No = 8 (11.11%) 
Yes = 1 (88.89%) 
 
Q7: What steps (if any) is your department taking to improve public health and fusion 
center integration? 
 
PH01: I have been in email contact with a local fusion center representative, but have not 
followed through and set up a meeting yet. The goal is to get some field staff trained 
in suspicious activity reporting and have them as additional sources of information 
out in the community. 
 
PH02: We do not have a physical PH person in the Fusion Center but staff have been 
trained as FLO. We invite them to ESF 8 briefings, we exchange emails, we 
coordinate during EOC activations when they have a liaison at city EOC. 
 
PH03: We have not discussed the idea. It is my understanding that the state department of 
public health collaborated with fusion centers; however, the information does not 




PH05: The state Department of Public Health is collaborating with the Fusion Center, but 
that has not occurred locally. 
 
PH06: The fusion center is open to having Public Health within the FC, but full time. This 
is difficult position, as you know PH preparedness has been understaffed and we 
can not give up a staff full time. The discussion is now surrounding can three or 
four staff split the time...the con; this will not generate the relationship needed to 
maintain good conversations. 
 
PH07: Attend joint conferences, attend meetings that have representation from other 
agencies intimately involved with fusion center. 
 
PH08: The Fusion Center frequently works with the regional preparedness structure and a 
representative will report out. 
 
















No = 6 (66.67%) 
Yes = 3 (33.33%) 
 






No = 0 (0%) 
Yes = 3 (100%) 
 







No = 2 (66.67%) 
Yes = 1 (33.33%) 
 






No = 1 (33.33%) 
Yes = 2 (66.67%) 
 
Q10. If the response was yes to any of the questions above, what specific information 
do the Fusion Centers typically request? 
 
PH02: Cyber and healthcare, communicable disease issues, including travel; SA regarding 
events with PH implications 
 
PH06: Most request are disease reports and education on highly infectious diseases. 
Looking for the facts and how diseases can be spread. 
 
PH08: The Terrorism Early Warning (TEW) system communicates between the Fusion 
Center and the regional public health preparedness committee. Information 
regarding large events, soft targets, threats from various groups, and other 
information is shared and discussed. 
 












No = 6 (66.67%) 
















No = 3 (33.33%) 
Yes = 6 (66.67%) 
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No = 9 (100%) 
Yes = 0 (0%) 
 
Q14. What steps (if any) is your department taking to improve public health and 
JTTF integration? 
 
PH01: None have been explored at this time. 
 
PH02: We are on listservs and trained as FLO. I think it is incumbent upon fusion centers 
to do a better job sharing info that is relevant to PH; we have had specific meetings 






PH05: I think that is more likely to be done by the Department of Public Health, but we 




PH07: same as above. We make an effort to stay informed through regular contact with 
members of the JTTF. 
 
PH08: Not so far, but I would be interested to see other possibilities. 
 
PH09: No current steps to improve Task Force integration. 
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No = 7 (77.78%) 
Yes = 2 (22.22%) 
 





No = 0 (0%) 
Yes = 2 (100%) 
 





No = 0 (0%) 
Yes = 2 (100%) 
 





No = 0 (0%) 
Yes = 2 (100%) 
 
Q17. If the response was yes to any of the questions above, what specific information 
do JTTFs typically request?  
 
PH02: Sit Awareness on PH issues for local incidents; info on cyber and healthcare; request 
to review info. 
 
PH07: The requests are not typical.   They are specific to an event or situation. OR they are 






Q18. How does public health receive threat information? 
 
PH01: Primarily through ESSENCE surveillance data and programs such as BioWatch. 
 
PH02: via email; mystateusa.com; HSIN 
 
PH03: At the local level, we rely on the state department of public health to disseminate 
this information. 
 
PH04: We receive none excepting communicable disease threat info. 
 
PH05: At the Department of Public Health, information sharing between agencies is getting 
better and better. It does not work as well from the state to the local level. 
 
PH06: Most information is shared through the Terrorism Liaison Officers (TLOs). Most 
intel is specific to special or large events. If there are any persons being monitored 
for disease that are lost we utilize them to track down individuals. 
 
PH07: Through EMA or Biowatch. 
 
PH08: The TEW representatives will inform at regional meetings and send out an email 
blast when necessary to agency representatives. 
 
PH09: Our regional coordination entity provides intelligence on threats identified for the 
area. 
 
Q19. Does the department feel that the process to obtain intelligence about credible 












No = 4 (44.44%) 
















No = 7 (77.78%) 
Yes = 2 (22.22%) 
 
Q21. What steps (if any) is the department taking to improve how it receives threat 
information? 
 
PH01: There are some concerns that ESSENCE does not function at its full capability due 
to outdated software. However, we are attempting to increase our surveillance 
capabilities with EMS partners, and potentially community partners such as 
schools. 
 
PH02: Keeping lines of communication with fusion center open; adding people to HSIN 






PH05: I am relatively new in my position (less than 6 months) and was previously at the 
Department of Public Health. Am trying to leverage relationships built previously to 
establish information sharing pathways. 
 
PH06: Maintaining open dialogue and sitting in local IMTs for events. It is all about 
relationships and keeping staff long-term helps. We have gone from a 58% turn over 
to 10%, this helps keep same people in positions long enough to form a solid 
relationship. 
 
PH07: Keeping this as part of exercises 
 
PH08: Not so far, but I would be interested to see other possibilities. 
 
PH09: No current steps are being taken 
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The following responses are from state public health agencies that have representatives 
in fusion centers. 
 














Q6. What roles do these representatives hold within the public health agency? 
 
PH11: 2 from emergency preparedness planning & operations, 2 from epidemiology 
PH13: Information Management 
PH14: Public Health Emergency Planner 
PH15: Public Health Emergency Planner 
 







No = 3 (75%) 
Yes = 1 (25%) 
 




Q9: If yes, which organization procured the clearance?  
 





Q10: Have any of the public health representatives received any training to work with 







No = 3 (75%) 
Yes = 1 (25%) 
 
Q11. If so, what type of training? 
 
PH14: Workshop and informational session 
 







No = 1 (25%) 
Yes = 3 (75%) 
 








No = 1 (25%) 
Yes = 3 (75%) 
 








No = 2 (50%) 
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Yes = 2 (50%) 
 
Q15: What steps (if any) is your department taking to improve public health and 
fusion center integration? 
 
PH11: None at the moment; the fusion center has primarily just created a linkage between 
the intelligence community and the public health agency (“knowing who to call 
when you have a question” kind of thing) 
 
PH12: We have a representative that works with the fusion center on a limited basis and to 
my knowledge, no steps are being taken to improve integration at this time. 
 
PH13: involving department in monthly meetings, conference calls, trainings and 
submitting critical information on a regular schedule for transmission. 
 






The following responses are from state health departments that did not have 
representation in fusion centers. 
 






No = 0 (0%) 
Yes = 3 (100%) 
 





No = 0 (0%) 
Yes = 3 (100%) 
 
Q28: Has public health contacted fusion centers, but the fusion center decided to not 






No = 2 (66.67%) 
Yes = 1 (33.33%) 
 
Q29: What steps (if any) is your department taking to improve public health and 
fusion center integration?  
 
PH10: none at this time 
PH12: pre-existing close collaborations and working relationships. 
PH16: Working on building relationships 
 





No = 2 (66.67%) 
Yes = 1 (33.33%) 
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Q32: If the response was yes to any of the questions above, what specific information 
do the Fusion Centers typically request?  
 
PH12: Clinical threat assessment and overview of pathophysiology; situational awareness 





The following responses are from state public health agencies that have representatives 
on the JTTF. 
 
Q16: Do these individuals work full-time or part-time in their role with the JTTF? 
 
PH12: Attend Meeting of the executive and plenary work group 
 
PH16: Attends Task force meetings 
 
Q17: What roles do these representatives hold within the public health agency? 
 
PH12: Departmental Director 
 
PH16: Public Health Preparedness Leadership 
 





No = 1 (50%) 
Yes= 1 (50%) 
 








Q21: Have any of the public health representatives received any training to work with 















No = 1 (50%) 
Yes= 1 (50%) 
 





No = 0 (0%) 
Yes = 2 (100%) 
 







Yes = 0 (0%) 
 
Q25: What steps (if any) is the department taking to improve public health and JTTF 
integration? 
 






The following responses are from state health agencies that do not have any 
representation on JTTFs.  
 








No = 3 (60%) 
Yes = 2 (20%) 
 








No = 1 (20%) 
Yes = 4 (80%)  
 









No = 4 (80%) 
Yes = 1 (20%) 
 
Q36: What steps (if any) is your department taking to improve public health and 




PH11: Have limited experience with JTTFs, and don’t know who or how to get engaged 
with them.  
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PH13: I don’t know 
 
PH14: It has been a long tireless effort including the JTTF in all of our planning efforts, 
preparedness projects, programs and training opportunities and we have not been invited 
to any meetings, events, nor has discussions included any input from DPH. 
 
PH15: Our PH planner works with the JTTF, as far as info flow, but is not able to be on 
the JTTF, due to not being a post-certified LE official. 
 








No = 4 (80%) 
Yes = 1 (20%) 
 
Q38a: If so, regarding public health threats?  
PH15: Yes 
 
Q38b: If so, regarding bioterrorism? 
PH15: Yes 
 
Q38c: If so, regarding response planning?  
PH15: Yes 
 
Q39: If the response was yes to any of the questions above, what specific information 
do JTTFs typically request?  
 
PH15: the FBI LNO works closely with the PH planner in areas of suspicious 




The following responses are from all state health departments that responded to the 
survey. 
 
Q40: How does public health receive threat information? 
 
PH10: Mostly from state emergency management. Also from federal [Department of 
Health and Human Services]. 
 
PH11: Fusion center (if they feel public health has a need to know); state emergency 
management agency; Federal partners 
 
PH12: through multiple channels of communication from ESF 8 stakeholders and partners 
as well as others within the federal, regional, intra-state and local levels. 
PH13: Fusion Center, FBI, and State Emergency Management 
 
PH14: CDC, HHAN Alert, ASPR, MRC. Regional Coordinating Coalitions, DHS, 
MEMA, FEMA, EAS 
PH15: thru Fusion Ctr, FBI LNO at JTTF, from state EMA 
 
PH16: Federal counterparts, county emergency managers 
 
Q41: Does the department feel that the process to obtain intelligence about credible 










No = 4 (57.14%) 
Yes = 3 (42.86% 
 










No = 5 (71.43%) 




Q43: What steps (if any) is the department taking to improve how it receives threat 
information? 
 
PH10: none at this time 
 
PH11: None at this time, however, there is a concern regarding “need to know” threshold 
- who determines at what point public health needs to be engaged/informed? 
 
PH12: Continuous evaluation of both exercise and real world events through after action 
reports and corrective actions. In addition, active networking with colleagues and partners 
during normal times. 
 
PH13: None that I know of. 
 
PH14: improving existing technology, IT and other means to receive information quickly. 
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